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Article
Human Rights Lost:
The (Re)making of an American Story
Christopher N.J. Roberts
The historical study of human rights has become an
important area of inquiry in recent years. In analyzing the
historical trajectory of human rights, legal scholars and
historians have typically focused on the human rights laws,
treaties, and charters that originated in the past and remain
powerful today. Yet some of the most transformative events in
our nation’s history have escaped notice through such
approaches. This Article introduces a new approach to the
historical study of human rights by focusing not on established
law, but rather on three “legal failures” that are completely
invisible within the framework of binding law and precedent: a
failed constitutional amendment in Washington D.C.; an
overruled appellate opinion from California; and an unlikely
movement to replace the United Nations with a more powerful
“world government.” This analysis reveals a surprising truth:
these legal failures permanently altered the trajectory of the
United States’ approach to human rights and continue to shape
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contemporary human rights institutions and practices. This
Article makes three key claims. First, a complete explanatory
account of contemporary institutions and practices must include
more than those laws, institutions, ideas, and practices that
persist into the present day; it must also account for numerous
legal, institutional, and ideational antecedents that are no
longer with us. Second, the dominant conception of human rights
within the United States—as an international rather than
domestic phenomenon—was actively created domestically in the
United States after World War II in order to advance a range of
ongoing, local-level political struggles. Third, to the extent that
human rights supporters in the United States today fail to
appreciate these domestic origins, it is quite possible that they
become unwitting collaborators of those who objected to the idea
of universal human rights in the past.

Introduction
For those waging social justice struggles in the United
States, human rights are not much of a domestic option—nor are
they much of a thought. In the United States, human rights are
viewed as matters of international concern rather than laws for
domestic application. International treaties, for instance, are
signed with the stipulation that human rights concepts do not
apply in the domestic arena and domestic judges rarely use
international human rights concepts in domestic decisions.1 This
international conception of human rights is widespread in the
United States and is rarely challenged by scholars, activists, or
the legal community. Human rights are simply, and perhaps
inevitably, viewed as matters for international rather than
domestic consumption. The fact that they are rarely applied in
the domestic context has limited their domestic presence in
domestic research, advocacy, and law.2
1. See M. Shah Alam, Enforcement of International Human Rights by
Domestic Courts in the United States, 10 ANN. SURV. INT’L & COMP. L. 27, 27–
31 (2004) (explaining that while the United States is active in pursuing
international human rights instruments, the application of those is not common
in domestic courts); see generally Elena A. Baylis, General Comment 24:
Confronting the Problem of Reservations to Human Rights Treaties, 17
BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 277, 277 (1999) (discussing the propensity for States to
sign human rights treaties with reservations, meaning that while they remain
in technical compliance, States are free to engage in the practices such treaties
condemn).
2. See generally MICHAEL JOHN GARCIA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
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This Article argues that the uniquely American conception
of human rights as international rather than domestic is neither
inevitable nor is it without consequence for those engaged in the
study and practice of human rights. Rather, this conception of
human rights was crafted in the years immediately following the
Second World War through a series of influential domestic
political struggles. These struggles pitted opposing definitions of
human rights against one another, ultimately resulting in the
triumph of an international-only conception of the term.
Although such struggles largely have been unexplored within
existing scholarship, this Article shows that they altered the
trajectory of human rights in the United States and left an
indelible mark on contemporary human rights debates.
Through a detailed analysis of new historical and archival
data, this Article investigates three historical events that offer a
window into the political struggles surrounding how best to
define the emergent human rights concept in the post-war era.
They include a failed constitutional amendment in Washington
D.C.,3 an overruled appellate opinion from California,4 and an
improbable movement to reorganize the world into nine
“kindred” societies.5 Interestingly, a scholar studying the history
of human rights will not find any direct evidence of such events
when examining existing law or foundational international
human rights texts such as the 1948 Universal Declaration of
Human Rights. Yet, this analysis demonstrates that each event
permanently altered the trajectory of the United States’
approach to human rights.
This Article therefore reveals that the United States’
contemporary approach to human rights is the consequence of
not just the laws on the books, but rather, that it has been
shaped by laws, ideas, and institutions that by all accounts have
been passed off by historians as legal failures. In analyzing the
failed amendment, overturned case, and a forgotten movement,
this Article also outlines a novel insight and new methodological
approach for legal historians—laws, cases, and movements that
RL32528, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND AGREEMENTS: THEIR EFFECT UPON U.S.
LAW 12–16 (2015) (explaining that the effect of an international treaty depends
on whether the treaty is self-executing on its date of ratification as compared to
a conflicting domestic law).
3. See S.J. Res. 102, 82d Cong. (1951).
4. See Fujii v. State, 217 P.2d 481 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1950).
5. See Comm. to Frame a World Constitution, Preliminary Draft of a
World Constitution, art. 5 (1948) [hereinafter Preliminary Draft of a World
Constitution].
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failed to come into being or achieve permanence in the American
legal system that can nevertheless exert significant influence on
contemporary affairs.6
The proposition that legal failures can alter the course of
history is not as improbable as it might appear at first glance.
To be sure, within a standard doctrinal analysis there is little if
any place for overruled case law, rescinded legislation, or
proposals that never in fact became law in the first instance.
Precedent, binding law, and valid legal authority is what
matters. But when examining the history of the law, legal
failures can be extremely important transformative agents of
change, even if scholars routinely overlook them. While this
Article focuses on the importance of this proposition for the field

6. The literature on the history of human rights has expanded greatly in
the past decade or so. A sampling from this ever-growing body of scholarship
includes CAROL ANDERSON, EYES OFF THE PRIZE: THE UNITED NATIONS AND
THE AFRICAN AMERICAN STRUGGLE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, 1944–55 (2003)
(discussing how the Cold War and United States participation in the United
Nations stymied the ability of African American leaders to advocate for social
and economic rights); ELIZABETH BORGWARDT, A NEW DEAL FOR THE WORLD:
AMERICA’S VISION FOR HUMAN RIGHTS (2005) (discussing how New Deal values
influenced post-World War II international political and legal institutions);
MARY L. DUDZIAK, COLD WAR CIVIL RIGHTS: RACE AND THE IMAGE OF
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2000) (discussing the relationship between the United
States civil rights conditions and United States foreign relations during the
Cold War); HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (Stefan-Ludwig
Hoffmann ed., 2011) (examining how human rights shaped universal morality
in the political crises and conflicts of the 1900s); ROGER NORMAND & SARAH
ZAIDI, HUMAN RIGHTS AT THE UN: THE POLITICAL HISTORY OF UNIVERSAL
JUSTICE (2008) (outlining the political history of human rights in the period
before and after the creation of the United Nations in light of national rivalries,
bureaucratic politics, and demands by disadvantaged groups); CHRISTOPHER
N.J. ROBERTS, THE CONTENTIOUS HISTORY OF THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF
HUMAN RIGHTS (2015) (addressing the conflicting ideas of what human rights
are and how those ideas were merged into fundamental human rights
documents); Kenneth Cmiel, The Recent History of Human Rights, 109 AM.
HIST. REV. 117 (2004) (highlighting the changes in historians’ approaches to
human rights in the 1990s); Zachary Elkins, Tom Ginsburg & Beth Simmons,
Getting to Rights: Treaty Ratification, Constitutional Convergence, and Human
Rights Practice, 54 HARV. INT’L L.J. 61 (2013) (examining the adoption of
human rights into national constitutions post-World War II); William I.
Hitchcock, The Rise and Fall of Human Rights? Searching for a Narrative from
the Cold War to the 9/11 Era, 37 HUM. RTS. Q. 80, 82 (2015) (arguing that
human rights have become entrenched in politics because powerful states have
protected them); Samuel Moyn, Substance, Scale, and Salience: The Recent
Historiography of Human Rights, 8 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 123, 129 (2012)
(postulating that historians are focusing more than the norms, doctrines, and
law, but also on the scale of application and differing ideologies).
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of human rights, the insight undoubtedly extends across areas
of law and historical legal scholarship.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I begins by
discussing the historical context surrounding the political
struggles to define the emergent human rights concept in the
United States. This context, though often neglected in existing
scholarship, is critical to understanding the well-known efforts
by Ohio Senator John Bricker in the early 1950s to amend the
United States Constitution. Part I continues by discussing what
is known about Bricker’s efforts. Though Bricker’s proposals to
amend the Constitution were never passed, the threat of the
amendment was sufficient to alter the actions of leading political
figures with respect to international human rights laws.
Moreover, the intent of Bricker’s amendment—to curb the
nation’s human rights treaty-making abilities and ambitions—
remains with us today. The section demonstrates that it is
essential for scholars to locate and analyze the lasting effects of
such “failures” and shows that although much has been written
about Bricker, there is much that remains missing from the
narrative.
Part II begins to address gaps in historical human rights
scholarship through an analysis of Fujii v. State,7 a watershed
case in 1950 that invalidated a state law based on the human
rights principles outlined in the 1945 United Nations Charter.
Though it was quickly overruled, the case set in motion a lasting
series of transformative events in the history of the United
States’ relationship with international human rights law. The
analysis of the case both illustrates the relevance of legal
failures and introduces a second key argument; despite the
contemporary conception of human rights as an international
phenomenon, the battle over human rights treaties actually
reflected local-level struggles that eventually helped to define
human rights within the domestic context.8
7. Fujii, 217 P.2d 481.
8. The Fujii case is examined in varying detail in the following studies:
KIM VOSS, THE MAKING OF AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM: THE KNIGHTS OF
LABOR AND CLASS FORMATION IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY (1993);
Jane Dailey, Race, Marriage, and Sovereignty in the New World Order, 10
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 511, 525–30 (2009); Aya Gruber, Who’s Afraid of
Geneva Law?, 39 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1017, 1070–72 (2007); Vicki C. Jackson, World
Habeas Corpus, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 303, 330–32 (2006); John E. Noyes, Roger
J. Traynor Professorship, 39 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 381, 387–88 (2009); Judith
Resnik, Law’s Migration: American Exceptionalism, Silent Dialogues, and
Federalism’s Multiple Ports of Entry, 115 YALE L.J. 1564, 1601–09 (2006);
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Part III continues to fill the void in existing scholarship by
analyzing the lasting consequences of a now largely-forgotten
“world government” movement that once aimed to dismantle the
United Nations and replace it with a stronger, more powerful
global organization.9 Though the movement for global
government—which occurred in the late 1940s and early
1950s—experienced a series of unprecedented political and
legislative victories, it ultimately collapsed under the weight of
its own success, but not before imparting a lasting influence on
how the United States was to view itself in international and
domestic affairs. Thus the movement provides additional
evidence of the Article’s two key claims: that even legal failures
can have enormous significance for the contemporary world and
that human rights struggles in the United States invariably
reflect local-level struggles.
Part IV of this Article synthesizes key lessons from each
section and offers a novel normative appraisal of the
contemporary place of human rights within domestic law, policy,
and scholarship. The section argues that the contemporary
conception of human rights was not inevitable, but rather was
determined by a series of local-level struggles over how to best
define human rights in the post-war era. While the relatively
well-known Bricker story offers a partial glimpse of these
struggles, a full account of the historical context surrounding
such struggles has to this point remained hidden from view. By
exposing the broader context, this Article shows that the victory
in such struggles was in fact a conception of human rights that
prioritized international over domestic application. Part IV
concludes by arguing that this conception has important
consequences for both law and scholarship.
I. A FAILED CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT
In the closing days of the Second World War, the soon-to-be
victorious Allies united in San Francisco to create an
international institution that would ensure lasting international
Johan D. van der Vyver, The Binding Force of Economic and Social Rights
Listed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 30 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. &
POL’Y 125, 164–68 (2008).
9. The “world government” political movement was “to establish a
constitutionally limited, democratically representative, federal world
government in order to effectively abolish war.” 1 JOSEPH PRESTON BARATTA,
THE POLITICS OF WORLD FEDERATION: UNITED NATIONS, UN REFORM, ATOMIC
CONTROL 1 (2004).
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peace and security.10 It is within the founding text of this
international institution—the United Nations (“UN”)—that the
contemporary idea of international human rights began to take
shape. The UN Charter (“the Charter”) articulated a
commitment to uphold the human rights of citizens.11 In
subsequent years, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(“UDHR”), a non-binding statement of principle, and the
International Covenant (“the Covenant”), a binding
international treaty, were to offer greater specificity and legal
grounding to the schematic articulation of human rights that
was offered in the Charter.12
These foundational texts are crucial to understanding the
history of human rights. Yet, as this Article argues, scholars and
historians must be more mindful of how the epic domestic legal
struggles surrounding human rights—many of which have long
been cast off as inconsequential failures—have played a greater
role in defining what human rights are and what place, if any,
they have in law in the United States. Part I of this Article
begins with an overview of the background of the post-World
War II historical context that provides the backdrop for the
events in question. It then examines what is known about
Senator John Bricker’s failed Constitutional amendment and its
lasting influence. As a departure point for the rest of this Article,
it then provides a critical analysis of the blind spots and gaps in
the existing historical literature.

10. History
of
the
United
Nations,
UNITED
NATIONS,
http://www.un.org/en/sections/history/history-united-nations/ (last visited Oct.
19, 2016).
11. U.N. Charter art. 1, ¶ 3 (“[I]n promoting and encouraging respect for
human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to
race, sex, language, or religion . . . .”).
12. What was originally intended to be a single Covenant that contained
civil, political, and socioeconomic rights was split in 1952 into the two
Covenants we have today—the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural
Rights. Together, the UDHR and the two Covenants are considered to be the
foundational human rights texts in the contemporary international system of
human rights. To avoid the obvious anachronism, in this Article when speaking
in historical context prior to 1952, I use the singular, “Covenant.” See JEFFREY
DUNOFF ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: NORMS, ACTORS, PROCESS: A PROBLEMORIENTED APPROACH, 379–81 (4th ed. 2015).
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A. BACKGROUND: HUMAN RIGHTS STRUGGLES IN THE UNITED
STATES

The human rights principles embodied in the Charter, the
UDHR, and the Covenant represented the principle that what
took place within one nation’s borders was properly a concern for
other nations. This principle was not novel in the domestic legal
context in the United States; the relevance of international
agreements for domestic law had been established in past
precedent. In nineteenth century America, for instance, many
local land disputes necessarily implicated existing international
agreements between sovereign nations.13 In 1920, the United
States Supreme Court, for instance, issued a landmark ruling in
Missouri v. Holland, holding a bilateral migratory bird treaty to
be the “supreme law of the land” for every state in the nation.14
As of October 1945, the official birth of the United Nations,
the United States and other member states had to contend with
a strikingly new innovation within the Charter’s brief provisions
on human rights. Within the Charter’s relatively vague,
preliminary articulation of human rights stood an important
proposition that spoke not of land or resources, but rather of the
treatment of individuals. Notably, under the terms of the
Charter, how individuals were treated in the domestic setting
had international repercussions. Citizens, it appeared, were now
a proper subject of international law.
Articles 55 and 56 of the Charter took the initial steps
toward defining this human rights concept anew for the postWorld War II context. Article 55 reads:
With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and
well-being which are necessary for peaceful and friendly
relations among nations based on respect for the
principle of equal rights and self-determination of
peoples, the United Nations shall promote:

13. See Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. 253, 314–16 (1829) (establishing the
concept of non-self-executing treaties); United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. 51,
82–98 (1833) (reversing Foster by holding that a treaty between Spain and the
United States was self-executing); see also Carlos M. Vázquez, Foster v. Neilson
and United States v. Percheman: Judicial Enforcement of Treaties, in
INTERNATIONAL LAW STORIES 151, 168 (John E. Noyes et al. eds., 2007); David
L. Sloss, Executing Foster v. Neilson: The Two-Step Approach to Analyzing SelfExecuting Treaties, 53 HARV. INT’L L. J. 135, 143–59 (2012).
14. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433–35 (1920).
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a.
higher standards of living, full employment,
and conditions of economic and social progress and
development;
b.
solutions of international economic, social,
health, and related problems; and international
cultural and educational cooperation; and
c.
universal respect for, and observance of,
human rights and fundamental freedoms for all
without distinction as to race, sex, language, or
religion.15
In turn, Article 56 provides that “[a]ll Members pledge
themselves to take joint and separate action in cooperation with
the Organization for the achievement of the purposes set forth
in Article 55.”16 Thus, the two articles set forth a preliminary
definition of the new post-war human rights concept. This
definition stressed that the well-being of citizens of United
Nations member states was the appropriate subject of
international concern. Moreover, the articles established the
commitment that member states would uphold and promote the
human rights of citizens. The sovereignty of states, of course,
was not dead—or even flagging. Article 2(7) of the UN Charter
states:
Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize
the UN to intervene in matters which are essentially
within the domestic jurisdiction of any state . . . but this
principle shall not prejudice the application of
enforcement measures under Chapter VII.17
In contemporary human rights research, foundational
human rights texts like the Charter, the UDHR, and the
Covenants, are, of course, crucial parts of the story. Without
these documents, the contemporary international system of
human rights would not exist in anything close to its current
form.18 That said, it is also crucial for scholars and historians not
15. U.N. Charter art. 55.
16. Id. art. 56.
17. Id. art. 2, ¶ 7. Chapter VII covers “Action with respect to threats to the
peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression.” Id. arts. 39–51.
18. The United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner
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to rely exclusively on the content of these documents to tell the
history of human rights. There are countless events and
contextual representations of the formation of human rights that
appear nowhere in the legal texts today that nevertheless shed
just as much, if not more, light on the history.19
Even before the United Nations could articulate specific
human rights provisions or nations could enact domestic
implementing legislation, the idea that certain domestic social
matters were properly a matter of concern for members of the
international community began to have consequences. Within
the United States in the late 1940s, for instance, the Truman
administration recognized that the United States’ treatment of
its own citizens had become a political challenge for some State
Department officials. In 1947, a presidential commission on civil
rights wrote in its report that “[a]n American diplomat cannot
forcefully argue for free elections in foreign lands without
meeting the challenge that in many sections of America qualified
voters do not have free access to the polls.”20 Local domestic
issues such as discrimination, the authors of the report
maintained, are not sealed within the nation’s own borders; they
“echo from one end of the globe to the other.”21
In 1950, the United States State Department amplified this
assertion when it revealed to the American public the
foundations of its new foreign policy approach in a 100-page
report entitled Our Foreign Policy.22 The State Department
stated the foundation of its new approach to foreign affairs was
rooted in a new post-War global reality.23 Nations—including
the United States—could no longer hide beneath a false mantle
of absolute sovereignty and argue that their own domestic
policies were of no concern to other nations.

has identified nine core international human rights documents, including the
UDHR and the Covenants. See OFFICE OF THE U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR HUM.
RTS., THE CORE INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES, at v, U.N. Sales No.
E/06/XIV/2 (2006).
19. For instance, one might look to drafting debates at the U.N., State
Department policy meetings, public opinion polls, or representations of human
rights in the media and in popular literature to locate important events
surrounding the development of the modern human rights concept.
20. U.S. PRESIDENT’S COMM. ON CIVIL RIGHTS, TO SECURE THESE RIGHTS:
THE REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT’S COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RIGHTS 101 (1947).
21. Id. at 100.
22. See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, OFFICE OF PUB. AFF., PUBLICATION 3972, OUR
FOREIGN POLICY 4 (1950).
23. Id. at 7–11 (describing the current state of global affairs).
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Our Foreign Policy began with a basic premise: “There is no
longer any real distinction between ‘domestic’ and ‘foreign’
affairs.”24 It then provided a series of examples of domestic
affairs that were now inseparable from foreign affairs.
Practically everything we do, the way we tax and spend our
national income, the way we run our public and private business,
the way we settle the differences among ourselves and with
other nations, what we say in our newspapers, over the air and
on public platforms, our attitudes toward each other and toward
other peoples—all these things affect not only our security and
well-being at home, but also our influence abroad.25
The Report concluded by offering its readers an appraisal of
the existing global reality. The longstanding distinction between
domestic and international matters, as well as the presumption
of unfettered state sovereignty, it suggested, simply did not exist
anymore.
Today the foreign policy of the United States is a
declaration of the interdependence of men and nations.
We now know, as Woodrow Wilson told us 34 years ago,
that “we are participants, whether we would or not, in
the life of the world. The interests of all nations are our
own also. We are partners with the rest. What affects
mankind is inevitably our affair as well as the affair of
Europe and Asia.”26
It was not by chance that drafters of the Report invoked the
words of former President Wilson. Though Wilson spoke those
words during World War I with the hope of creating a “League”
that would help develop a lasting peace and ensure friendly
relations among the nations of the world, the international
commitment to do so fell apart before the necessary institutional
conditions could be achieved.27 In particular, a strong group of
isolationists within the United States Senate objected to joining
the League of Nations.28 Without the United States’
participation, the organization was doomed from the start and
24.
25.
26.
27.

Id. at 4.
Id.
Id. at 99–100.
See JOHN MILTON COOPER, JR., BREAKING THE HEART OF THE WORLD:
WOODROW WILSON AND THE FIGHT FOR THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS 55–108 (2001).
28. See, e.g., id. at 55 (explaining that the opposition was led by senator
Henry Cabot Lodge and the republican leadership at the time).
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soon the world descended into war once again. Nevertheless,
even after another World War, a strong contingent of
isolationists remained in Congress. Because they continued to
object to the constraints, obligations, and outlays that an
internationalist agenda would impose on the United States, the
exhortations within Truman’s foreign policy report sought to
make the case that there was no longer any political position
that could be legitimately be called “isolationism.”29
International politics were already part of domestic politics, and
vice versa—even in the area of how a nation treated its
citizens.30 Thus as early as 1950, political leaders in the United
States had begun to articulate a vision of policy that prioritized
the application of international principles in domestic law. But
even the strongest interpretation of this policy did not bind the
domestic actions of the United States in a way an enforceable
human rights treaty might.
Although the State Department recognized that one nation’s
treatment of its own citizens was a valid concern for all, it also
recognized that actually instituting the idea and establishing
the requisite political and legal institutions was nothing short of
revolutionary. The same foreign policy report conceded:
The drafting of human-rights covenants is one of the
boldest as well as one of the most difficult projects ever
conceived by a group of nations. In the judgment of
history, this quiet and generally unsung work may rank
as one of the great revolutionary enterprises of the
United Nations.31
Several months before the UDHR would be completed and
adopted by the General Assembly, in August of 1948, a State
Department official wrote of the dramatic nature of the
Covenant in its public bulletin:
The theory of the covenant in itself is revolutionary: an
undertaking by international treaty to insure certain
rights which have traditionally been regarded as being
solely of national concern. A sufficient impetus has been
created in the Commission for the completion of a
29. See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, OFFICE OF PUB. AFF., supra note 22, at 16.
30. See id. at 98–99 (discussing the universality of human rights and its
presence in the United States from the inception of the country).
31. Id. at 98.
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covenant, on the basis of a sincere desire to avoid
catastrophes such as those launched by Hitler in his
persecution of the Jews, and to improve the standards of
international human rights in a field which appears to
many to be more important than the ever expanding field
of science. But this impetus may be lost if the initial
program is too ambitious. To allow an individual to
appeal from a decision of his country’s court of last resort
is a serious step; yet this might be the consequence of
recognizing the right of individual petition.32
During this period, in fact, a number of commentators
underscored the manifest challenges associated with the new
human rights project by conceding its revolutionary nature.
After the UN Charter was complete, and just as the UDHR and
Covenant were underway, even the most dedicated human
rights advocates at the time spoke with a mix of hope and
uncertainty about its radical nature. For example, John
Humphrey, the Canadian legal scholar responsible for the initial
draft of the UDHR, commented during a gathering of academics:
[L]et us not be blind to the difficulties. What the United
Nations is trying to do is revolutionary in character.
Human rights are largely a matter of relationships
between the state and individuals, and therefore a
matter which has been traditionally regarded as being
within the domestic jurisdiction of states. What is now
being proposed is, in effect, the creation of some kind of
supranational supervision of this relationship between
the state and its citizens.33
In 1948, the renowned scholar of human rights and
international law, Hersch Lauterpacht, offered a similar
appraisal of what he believed was an “almost revolutionary”
development within the law.34 Lauterpacht’s use of the word
revolutionary, however, was not based on the mere possibility of
incorporating international law into domestic law. Unlike the

32. James Pomeroy Hendrick, Progress Report on Human Rights, 19 DEP’T
ST. BULL. 159, 163 (1948).
33. John P. Humphrey, International Protection of Human Rights, 255
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 15, 21 (1948).
34. Hersch Lauterpacht, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 25
BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 354, 367 (1948).
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State Department and Humphrey, he was referring to an actual
instance in which the Supreme Court of the United States
seemed to be bringing homeward the international human rights
provisions in the UN Charter. In Hurd v. Hodge, Lauterpacht
wrote, “the Supreme Court of the United States, by way of a
novel and almost revolutionary interpretation of the Fourteenth
Amendment of the Constitution . . . stated, without referring
expressly to the Charter, that prohibition of discrimination was
now—by reason, inter alia, of treaties concluded by the United
States—part of the public policy of its law.”35
Thus, it appeared at the time that the principles contained
within international human rights treaties were slowly being
incorporated into the domestic political sphere. Despite the
domestic emergence of international human rights principles,
however, whether the new international idea of human rights
would be truly revolutionary was still an open question; it
depended on whether domestic law and domestic politics were
amenable to incorporating international human rights law into
their own framework. Again, this historical process is one of epic
successes and momentous failures. Typically, the successes,
rather than the failures, occupy the most prominent place in the
history books.36 Yet, a historical understanding that is based
solely—or even mostly—on historical successes and the laws,
treaties, institutions, and ideas that survive into the present is
a historical understanding that is incomplete.
B. SENATOR JOHN BRICKER’S CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE
Ohio Senator John Bricker’s efforts to restrict the treatymaking provisions within the United States Constitution and
the presidential powers surrounding executive agreements are
some of the most well-known domestic episodes in the history of
United States human rights and international law.37 Yet while
35. Id.
36. See, e.g., ELIZABETH BORGWARDT, A NEW DEAL FOR THE WORLD:
AMERICA’S VISION FOR HUMAN RIGHTS (2005) (chronicling the history of
American involvement in the movement that led to the creation of the UN
Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and modern conceptions
of human rights); MARY ANN GLENDON, A WORLD MADE NEW: ELEANOR
ROOSEVELT AND THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS (2001)
(detailing Eleanor Roosevelt’s involvement in the creation of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights).
37. See Louis Henkin, U.S. Ratification of Human Rights Conventions: The
Ghost of Senator Bricker, 89 AM. J. INT’L L. 341, 349 (1995); see also DUANE
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Bricker’s efforts have been well-documented by historians and
human rights scholars, the broader context within which Bricker
was operating has to date remained relatively unexplored.38 This
section describes what is known about Bricker’s efforts to amend
the Constitution and their lasting impact. In doing so, the
section serves as a departure point for investigating who and
what Bricker was fighting against—namely, other legal
“failures,” often passed over by scholars—that nevertheless
permanently altered the course of human rights in the United
States.
1. A Proposal to Amend the United States Constitution
Bricker first spoke to his Senate colleagues in the summer
and fall of 1951 about his proposed amendment to prevent the
United States from entering into human rights agreements. His
efforts were centered on the Covenant, a binding international
human rights treaty then being drafted at the United Nations.
Using his characteristic apocryphal rhetoric, he warned them
that the Covenant “would permit the destruction of freedom of
the press” and “could be used to destroy freedom of religion.”39
During these early Senate debates, he drew a deep political line
around the issue with the suggestion that “no patriotic American
will be able to support the United Nations if it continues to
threaten national sovereignty by claiming jurisdiction over
fundamental human rights. Those who encourage the UN’s
treaty-making ambitions are the UN’s worst enemies.”40 In
September 1951 Bricker called the Covenant “a trap for the
liberties of the American people” endorsed by a State
Department that was bent upon creating a “world
government.”41
Scholars have extensively studied the events surrounding
the Bricker amendment controversy during the 1950s to
determine the reason Bricker led this multi-year crusade
TANANBAUM, THE BRICKER AMENDMENT CONTROVERSY ix–xi (1988); NATALIE
HEVENER KAUFMAN, HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES AND THE SENATE 29–36 (1990).
38. See Henkin, supra note 37, at 341.
39. 97 CONG. REC. 11,510 (1951) (statement of Sen. Bricker). At this point,
there were only plans for a single Covenant. It subsequently was split into the
two Covenants we have today, the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (“ICCPR”), and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and
Cultural Rights (“ICESCR”).
40. Id. at 10,795.
41. Id. at 11,513.
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against human rights treaties.42 It is well known now that
Bricker was concerned with a number of things that related to
human rights treaties. For example, given the geopolitical
climate at the time, Bricker often claimed that being obligated
to follow international human rights treaties would subject
Americans to communist influence within domestic law.43
Similarly, Bricker argued that human rights treaties would
diminish the Constitutional protections and basic rights
afforded to American citizens.44 Another common bundle of
arguments Bricker offered was that human rights treaties would
infringe on domestic jurisdiction, states’ rights, and of course the
limiting of national sovereignty.45
An examination of the initial resolutions Bricker submitted
in the Senate, along with the arguments he raised when
speaking on the Senate floor, provides support for these themes
that are the mainstay of the Bricker story to date. On July 17,
1951, Bricker submitted Senate Resolution 177 (“S. Res. 177”),
the first of many resolutions.46 Although S. Res. 177 was only a
hortatory statement, it clearly outlined the general nature of his
grievances with human rights treaties as well as the course of
action he would take in subsequent years. The text read:
Resolved, That it is the sense of the Senate that–
1. the Draft International Covenant on Human Rights,
as revised by the United Nations Commission on Human
Rights at its seventh session, would, if ratified as a
treaty, prejudice those rights of the American people
which are now protected by the bill of rights of the
Constitution of the United States;

42. See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley, The United States and Human Rights
Treaties: Race Relations, the Cold War, and Constitutionalism, 9 CHINESE J.
INT’L L. 321, 324–31 (2010); Natalie Hevener Kaufman & David Whiteman,
Opposition to Human Rights Treaties in the United States Senate: The Legacy
of the Bricker Amendment, 10 HUM. RTS. Q. 309, 309–313 (1988); Nelson
Richards, The Bricker Amendment and Congress’s Failure to Check the Inflation
of Executive’s Foreign Affairs Powers, 1951-1954, 94 CAL. L. REV. 175, 176–78,
184–87 (2006).
43. See Kaufman & Whiteman, supra note 42, at 326–27 (recognizing that
Senator Bricker wished to curb the use of executive agreements but arguing
that Bricker’s primary initial target was human rights treaties).
44. Id. at 322–23.
45. Id. at 323–25, 327–28.
46. S. Res. 177, 82d Cong. (1951).
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2. the President of the United States should advise the
United Nations that the proposed International
Covenant on Human Rights is not acceptable to the
United States; and
3. the President of the United States should instruct
United States representatives at the United Nations to
withdraw from further negotiations with respect to the
Covenant on Human Rights, and all other covenants,
treaties, and conventions which seek to prescribe
restrictions on individual liberty which, if passed by the
Congress
as
domestic
legislation,
would
be
unconstitutional.47
For Bricker, the Covenant was the embodiment of an
internationalist agenda that sought to integrate international
institutions and laws with domestic institutions and laws in the
United States. His solution was to urge the Senate and the
American public to pressure the Truman administration to halt
its participation not only in the ongoing drafting of the
Covenant, but all future human rights projects at the United
Nations.48
If the text of the resolution left anything to the imagination
of his Senate colleagues, Bricker quickly put to rest any question
about his intentions regarding the Covenant specifically, and
international human rights treaties generally:
I have submitted this afternoon for appropriate reference
a simple resolution declaring it to be the sense of the
Senate that the proposed covenant on human rights be
not approved, and that negotiations with respect thereto
by representatives of the United States be terminated.
My purpose in offering this resolution is to bury the socalled covenant on human rights so deep that no one
holding high public office will ever dare to attempt its
resurrection.49
Bricker was not one to hold back his vitriol or hyperbole. He
went on to suggest that the Covenant would better be called the

47. Id.
48. See 97 CONG. REC. 8254 (1951).
49. Id. at 8263.
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“Covenant on Human Slavery or subserviency to government.”50
This treaty, he continued was a “monstrous document” that
amounted to nothing more than a “blueprint for slavery.”51 For
Bricker, this kind of charged rhetoric when he submitted his
resolutions was quite common; he often conducted lengthy and
impassioned floor discussions to explain the purpose of his
legislative proposals.52
Another of Bricker’s primary concerns was that
international human rights treaties would require the cession of
United States sovereignty. Though Article 2(7) of the UN
Charter reaffirmed the sovereignty of nations, the human rights
provisions contained within the Charter explicitly introduced
the idea that domestic issues had international ramifications,
thereby putting into question the true extent and limits of state
sovereignty.53 Throughout his battle, Bricker warned lawmakers
and the American public not to surrender their sovereignty. For
example, in one Senate speech he said: “No nation has any real
sovereignty if the economic and political rights which it extends
to its people are subject to recognition, modification and review
by an international authority.”54 In another speech he spoke in
sweeping terms about the danger of relinquishing national
sovereignty: “[T]he paramount issue of our time is whether or
not the sovereignty and the Constitution of the United States
shall be preserved. Because of a constitutional loophole which I
shall discuss, it is possible for the sovereignty and the
independence of the United States to be surrendered by
treaty.”55 Indeed, the fear of losing the nation’s sovereignty to
international human rights was a central issue for Bricker for
years to come.
Bricker submitted his next resolution two months later, in
September 1951. Unlike his previous resolution, this was not
simply a hortatory resolution intended to indicate a political
mood within the Senate. Instead, this resolution, Senate Joint
Resolution 102 (“S.J. Res. 102”), was the first official version of
his many subsequent resolutions that called for the amendment
of the United States Constitution.56 Similar to his earlier Senate
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Id. at 8255.
Id.
Id. at 8254–63.
U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 7.
97 CONG. REC. 11,512 (1951) (statement of Sen. Bricker).
98 CONG. REC. 908 (1952) (statement of Sen. Bricker).
S.J. Res. 102, 82d Cong. (1951).
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discussion, the discussion that he offered the Senate in support
of S.J. Res. 102 also contained a number of the themes that had
been outlined in historical scholarship on Bricker. For example,
he spoke at length about how the Covenant on Human Rights
would diminish constitutional protections that were afforded to
American citizens and would infringe on the nation’s
sovereignty. The State Department, he argued, “was forced to
choose between the Constitution and national sovereignty on the
one hand and the prospect of achieving in the future a world
government. The State Department chose world government.”57
He continued: “The Covenant on Human Rights is a trap for the
liberties of the American people.”58 And of course, much of his
discussion was suffused with anti-communist, Cold War
rhetoric. He warned that a “majority of the U.N. members are
nations which have succumbed to communism, socialism, or
some form of dictatorial rule. The common characteristic of all
these countries is that they exalt the power of the state over the
individual.”59 Thus, it was as clear to his contemporaries as it is
to historians today that one of Bricker’s main goals was to
prevent the integration of international human rights principles
into domestic law.
2. Influence of Senator Bricker’s Amendment
Within historical literature, the consensus regarding
Senator Bricker’s influence is clear: though unsuccessful in
amending the Constitution, the threat of an amendment was
extremely influential with respect to shaping the United States’
participation at the United Nations on human rights issues and
treaty-making, as well as its foreign and domestic policies
regarding human rights.60 Specifically, it caused the Eisenhower
Administration to take actions that set a course for decades to
come.
By the spring of 1953, the domestic political pressures had
mounted upon the Eisenhower Administration. A February 1953
State Department memo summed up the administration’s
concern over Bricker’s actions:
57. 97 CONG. REC. at 11,513 (1951) (statement of Sen. Bricker).
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. See TANANBAUM, supra, note 37, at 191–215 (describing Bricker’s
subsequent attempts to pass a constitutional amendment and the impact on the
Eisenhower administration).
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The Covenants are under attack by large and important
groups in this country such as the American Bar
Association and a number of members of the U.S. Senate.
For the administration to press ahead with the
Covenants would tend to keep alive and strengthen
support for the Bricker amendments to the
Constitution.61

The coalition spearheaded by Bricker was strong enough to
compel the Eisenhower Administration to back away from
committing to the Covenants, originally intended to be the teeth
of international human rights agreements. The President chose
to quit the Covenant, which had by this time been split into two
documents.62 Under President Eisenhower, the State
Department set forth its new plan: the United States would not
attempt to ratify the Covenants, but it would continue to take
part in their drafting.63
As Henkin argues, the long-term effects of Bricker’s
agitation were profound.64 This episode showed that there would
be a political cost for supporting human rights treaties. As a
result, elected representatives began to tread very carefully, if
at all, when offering their support for such treaties. Legally, this
qualified support took the form of addenda to international
treaties, which stated that such treaties would have no domestic
effect. Such practices have continued into the present day. The
United States, upon signing and ratifying human rights treaties,
always includes “legal footnotes” called reservations,
understandings, and declarations (“RUD”s). These are
statements that range from merely voicing opinion to completely
negating entire portions of the treaty.65

61. United States Policy Regarding the Draft United Nations Covenants on
Human Rights: the 1953 Change, in FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED
STATES, 1952-1954, UNITED NATIONS AFFAIRS, VOLUME III, at 1551 (Ralph R.
Goodwin & William Z. Slany eds., 1979).
62. Id. at 1552–54.
63. See id. at 1572; see also ANDERSON, supra note 6, at 227–29.
64. Henkin, supra note 37, at 341–50.
65. Baylis, supra note 1, at 277–329 (discussing the propensity for States
to sign human rights treaties with reservations, meaning that while they
remain in technical compliance, States are free to engage in the practices such
treaties condemn).
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3. Scholarly Blind Spots in the Bricker Controversy
Ironically, a scholar studying the three foundational human
rights texts—the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(“ICCPR”), and the International Covenant on Economic, Social,
and Cultural Rights (“ICESCR”)—will find little if any direct
evidence of Bricker’s impact (or even his existence). Nor is there
any evidence of Bricker’s proposed amendment in the United
States Constitution or domestic case law. The Bricker
controversy thus draws attention to what is a major issue for
scholarship that seeks to trace the origins of the modern
international human rights regime: a case that was overruled or
proposed legislation that never became law still can exert a
dramatic influence on subsequent laws and policies.
Although much has been written about the Bricker
Amendment controversy, there are a number of crucial matters
scholars have failed to investigate, such as: Who exactly was
Bricker arguing against? Why did he need to assemble such a
massive coalition? What ideas, laws, and movements was he
fighting against? The result is that we have only a very partial
knowledge of the historical circumstances surrounding Senator
Bricker’s actions. Much is known about Bricker’s actions and the
content of his proposals, yet the broader context surrounding his
campaign to amend the Constitution have thus far remained
hidden from view.
In particular, the questions posed above relate to what were
Bricker’s “aversive alternatives.”66 That is, what threats,
whether real or imagined, was he fighting against?67 By
assuming that the entire episode was at least in part reactive, it
is possible to trace back in time the nature and influence of those
institutions, laws, organizations, and ideas that are no longer
with us, but nevertheless significantly shaped contemporary
practices, institutions and outcomes.68 Such a priori
assumptions raise new questions and set the research on a new
course into uncharted historical territory in search of Bricker’s
causal antecedents. It is not enough to simply ask what Bricker

66. See Kim Lane Scheppele, Aspirational and Aversive Constitutionalism:
The Case for Studying Cross National Influence Through Negative Models, 1
INT’L J. CONST. L. 296, 298–99 (2003).
67. Id. at 298.
68. Id. at 300.
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was fighting for; it is also essential to also ask what and who he
was fighting against.
Specifically, it is necessary to ask who was responsible for
promoting the alternative version(s) of human rights that John
Bricker opposed. As it turns out, scholars generally have not
followed these important historical leads that are actually
displayed quite prominently in the primary source materials.
Throughout his speeches and writings, Bricker made it a point
to broadcast who he was fighting against; for example, aiming at
President Truman and a number of people within his
administration who were actively involved in the creation of the
Covenant on Human Rights.69 Similarly, he accused Attorney
General McGrath of misleading the American people through his
assurances that the Covenant did not “weaken the protection of
freedoms secured by the Bill of Rights.”70 He suggested that the
President, the State Department, and the United States
representatives to the United Nations had been working under
the influence of communist nations and their ideas.71 He singled
out both State Department officials and representatives to the
United Nations, such as Dean Acheson,72 Eleanor Roosevelt,73
and her advisor at the State Department, James Pomeroy
Hendrick, as being intent on subverting the constitutional rights
of Americans.74
Yet while Bricker spent a great deal of time attacking
President Truman and members of his administration, in his
initial Senate debates he devoted far more time to attacking
three law professors: Harvard Law Professor Zechariah Chafee,
Robert Hutchins of the University of Chicago, and Columbia
University’s Philip C. Jessup.75 Bricker devoted significant time
to attacking Chafee and his involvement with a report on
freedom of the press that was drafted by a group headed by
Hutchins.76 He went to great lengths to discredit the views of
Jessup, mentioning him at least twenty times in one Senate
debate.77 Bricker also mentioned, time and time again, a man
69. 97 CONG. REC. 8254 (1951).
70. Id. at 8259 (statement of Sen. Bricker).
71. See id. at 11,511.
72. Id. at 11,512–13.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. See id. at 8257–58, 11,509.
76. See id. at 8257–58.
77. Id. at 11,509–13; see also John W. Bricker, Constitutional Insurance for
a Safe Treaty-Making Policy, 60 DICK. L. REV. 103, 116 (1956); John W. Bricker
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named Sei Fujii.78 Who were these people and what alternative
visions of human rights did they represent? These new lines of
inquiry that take the historical analysis in exciting new
directions are based on a basic, though often neglected, fact—
people, ideas, and laws that no longer possess clear relevance or
direct import for contemporary observers might have been
supremely influential in their day.79
The next two sections of this Article prioritize asking what
particular concepts, such as human rights, mean within the
historical context under consideration. Although the brief
foregoing analysis of Bricker’s crusade seems to confirm much of
what is already known about the history, it also raises several
questions that scholars have not yet asked. Specifically, who was
promoting the alternative conception of human rights Bricker
fought against? Bricker often used a number of somewhat
unfamiliar terms in his discussions of the United Nations and
the Human Rights Covenant. For instance, throughout his
Senate debates, he devoted significant time to discussing the
dangers of “world government.”80 He spoke about the idealistic
and naïve “one-worlders,” and he excoriated those who
advocated for a “world Bill of Rights.”81 What do these terms
refer to, and what do they suggest about the broader historical
context?
What is particularly notable is the fact that Bricker
maintained his focus on the Fujii case (discussed in the following
Section), continued to fight against “world government”
advocates, and discredited the work of Jessup, Hutchins and
Chafee simultaneously.82 Kaufman and Whiteman (1988) show
that in 1953 the amount of time Bricker devoted to the
discussion of world government in the Senate exceeded the
amount of time he spent discussing the threat of communism,
human rights infringing on domestic law, or the threat human
rights posed to democracy.83 The topic of Sei Fujii, world
& Charles A. Webb, Treaty Law vs. Domestic Constitutional Law, 29 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 529, 544 (1954).
78. 97 CONG. REC. 8254–68, 11,509–14; 98 CONG. REC. 911 (1952).
79. See Bricker, supra note 77 and Bricker & Webb, supra note 77, for
examples of such highly influential ideas and people.
80. See 97 CONG. REC. 8254–68, 11,509–14 (1951); 98 CONG. REC. 911
(1952); see also Bricker, supra note 77, at 116; Bricker & Webb, supra note 77,
at 543.
81. 97 CONG. REC. 8263 (1951).
82. Id. at 8257–63, 11,510–12 (1951); 98 CONG. REC. 911 (1952).
83. Kaufman & Whiteman, supra note 42, at 321–32.
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government, and the views of these professors, in fact, take up
such a significant part of Bricker’s public speaking life that they
demand at least some investigation to figure out exactly what
these concepts meant to Bricker and why he was so persistent in
his attacks.
In the standard Bricker story, historians either do not pick
up on his mention of Sei Fujii or his “world government” and
“world constitution” language, or presume that Bricker is simply
talking about the United Nations and international human
rights treaties. In fact, what he spoke of was quite different.84
Bricker did not just look forward to what would happen with
future covenants and human rights treaties; he also looked back
at what had happened already and reacted to very recent
developments, movements, and trends that were at the time
raw, well-known, and widely discussed.85 Because many such
references have been overruled, discredited, and forgotten,
however, scholars have not integrated them fully into the history
of human rights in the United States. The next two parts of this
Article bring this neglected historical context into view by
exploring who Sei Fujii and Robert Hutchins were, what “world
government” was, and what each represented in Bricker’s
struggle.86
II. AN OVERRULED CASE
Today, courts in the United States do not consider the
validity of domestic laws in light of international human rights
treaties.87 This was not always the case. In 1950, a California
appellate decision named the human rights provisions in the UN
Charter as the supreme law of the land, thereby invalidating a
California law that prevented Japanese residents from owning
land.88 The Fujii case, as it came to be known, initiated a
political firestorm.89 Two years later, the California Supreme
Court forever wiped the decision from the books.90
84. See Kaufman & Whiteman, supra note 42, at 325–31.
85. See id.
86. A subsequent article examines Bricker’s contentious relationship with
the other two law professors, Chafee and Jessup.
87. See Kaufman & Whiteman, supra note 42, at 309.
88. Fujii v. State, 217 P.2d 481, 486 (Cal. Ct. App. 1950), rev’ d, 242 P.2d
617 (Cal. 1952).
89. See 97 CONG. REC. 11,512 (1951).
90. Fujii v. State, 242 P.2d 617 (Cal. 1952).
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Although there is little direct evidence in existing law of
what is now a legal nullity, the case represented a sharp turning
point in the domestic history of human rights. Following the
Fujii case, what had become an increasingly common practice—
citing international human rights provisions in domestic
cases91—soon halted. The case lit a fire for Senator Bricker’s
opposition.92 The domestic struggle over Fujii helped translate,
and therefore define, what human rights were and what they
would be for the American public.93
A. THE FUJII CASE OF 1950
During the late 1940s and early 1950s, many indicators
pointed to the fact that domestic courts and aggrieved parties
were considering whether and how the provisions of the UN
Charter related to domestic laws and policies within the United
States. Between 1948 and 1955, there were a number of
Supreme Court cases in which the Court, parties’ briefs, or
amicus briefs, referenced the United Nations Charter in such
discussions.94 Similarly, during this period, the same thing
began to appear in state court cases in the United States. Many
of those who had suffered what they perceived to be harms
started looking towards international law as a moral
touchstone—if not legal authority—for shaping the domestic
law. In a series of state-level cases, for instance, the court
discussed the Charter or the issues surrounding the use of the
Charter within the domestic context.95 Only one of these cases,
91. See generally Bert B. Lockwood Jr., The United Nations Charter and
United States Civil Rights Litigation: 1946-1955, 69 IOWA L. REV. 901 (1984)
(detailing cases applying the human rights provisions of the United Nations
Charter in state and federal court).
92. See 97 CONG. REC. 11,512 (1951); Kaufman & Whiteman, supra note
42, at 316–17.
93. See Kaufman & Whiteman, supra note 42, at 316–18.
94. These cases have been compiled by Lockwood Jr., supra note 91, and
include Rice v. Sioux City Mem’l Park Cemetery, Inc., 349 U.S. 70 (1955);
Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954); Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953);
Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S.
306 (1952); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952); United States ex rel.
Jaegeler v. Carusi, 342 U.S. 347 (1952); Henderson v. United States, 339 U.S.
816 (1950); Stainback v. Mo Hock Ke Lok Po, 336 U.S. 368 (1949); Hurd v.
Hodge, 334 U.S. 24 (1948); Bob-Lo Excursion Co. v. Michigan, 333 U.S. 28
(1948); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948); Oyama v. California, 332 U.S.
633 (1948); Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm’n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948).
95. See Rice v. Sioux City Mem’l Park Cemetery, 60 N.W.2d 110, 157 (Iowa
1953) (holding that the Charter has no application to private conduct between
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however—the 1950 Fujii case—actually invalidated a domestic
law.96
The Fujii case involved the inability of Japanese residents
to own land in California.97 Sei Fujii was a resident of California
who, because of existing immigration and naturalization laws,
could not become an American citizen on account of his Japanese
ancestry.98 Thus, the California Alien Land Law prohibited him
from ever owning land in the State.99 After his legal challenge to
the Alien Land Law was defeated in the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Fujii appealed.100 On appeal, the court decided
to invalidate California’s Alien Land Law based on a novel—
perhaps “revolutionary”—theory of law that integrated U.S.
Constitutional provisions with international law and domestic
state law.101
Citing Article VI, Section 2 of the United States
Constitution, the court maintained that the Charter—a valid
treaty—was, under the supremacy clause, “now the supreme law
of the land.”102 Once the court had established the UN Charter
as governing law, it spelled out the implications that required
that, “every State in the Union accept and act upon the Charter
according to its plain language and its unmistakable purpose
citizens); Fujii v. State, 242 P.2d 617, 621 (Cal. 1952) (holding that the Charter
was not a self-executing treaty and therefore could not supersede state
legislation); Dossett v. State, 52 So. 2d 490, 491 (Miss. 1951) (holding that the
Charter cannot divest a state from its own jurisdiction); In re Backstron, 220
P.2d 742, 743 (Cal. Ct. App. 1950) (implying that the Charter falls outside the
scope of a habeas corpus inquiry); Fujii v. State, 217 P.2d 481, 488 (Cal. Ct. App.
1950), rev’d, 242 P.2d 617 (Cal. 1952) (holding that the Charter was the supreme
law of the land); Namba v. McCourt, 204 P.2d 569, 604 (Or. 1949) (using the
Charter to support its holding that Oregon’s alien land law was
unconstitutional); Perez v. Sharp, 198 P.2d 17, 45 (Cal. 1948) (referencing the
Charter to support its holding that California’s ban on interracial marriage was
unconstitutional); Kemp v. Rubin, 69 N.Y.S.2d 680, 686 (N.Y. 1947) (stating
that the Charter expressly “h[as] nothing to do with domestic matters nor with
agreements between citizens of the United States”). The cases noted here
represent the author’s own analysis.
96. Fujii, 217 P.2d at 481.
97. Id. at 482.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 482–83.
100. Fujii, 242 P.2d at 619.
101. Id. at 622.
102. Id. at 619–20. The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution
provides that “all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of
the United States shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every
state shall be bound thereby, anything in the constitution or laws of any state
to the contrary notwithstanding.” U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
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and intent.”103 The plain language in Articles 55 and 56 of the
Charter, the court argued, were entirely clear:
It is agreed in Chapter IX, Article 55, that ‘the United
Nations shall promote . . . universal respect for, and
observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms
for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or
religion.’ By Article 56 it is declared that ‘All Members
pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in
cooperation with the Organization for the achievement of
the purposes set forth in Article 55.’104
Ultimately, the court held that the provisions within the Alien
Land Law were in “direct conflict with the plain terms of the
Charter.”105
Clearly such a discrimination against a people of one race
is contrary both to the letter and to the spirit of the
Charter which, as a treaty, is paramount to every law of
every state in conflict with it. The Alien Land Laws must
therefore yield to the treaty as the superior authority.
The restrictions of the statute based on eligibility to
citizenship, but which ultimately and actually are
referable to race or color, must be and are therefore
declared untenable and unenforceable.106
Although this decision was overruled within two years, it
stood for a dramatic proposition: the United States and its own
domestic laws were bound by the international human rights
provisions within the Charter.107 Even at this early stage—that
is, before the binding Covenant had been completed—the brief
human rights provisions within the Charter were now to be
counted, at least by this California court, as the supreme law of
the land.108
What was actually a short and straightforward opinion set
off a firestorm in the United States, and it is at this point in the

103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

Fujii, 217 P.2d at 486.
Id. at 487.
Id. at 488.
Id.
See id.
See id.
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story that Senator John Bricker becomes important.109 The
struggle over what this case represented was an extremely
important, defining moment in the post-World War II history of
international human rights.110 Historical literature focuses on
the orientation of Bricker’s actions toward mitigating future
effects of the Covenant and other human rights treaties.111 This
is absolutely true. But as the Fujii case makes clear, Bricker was
also reacting to a series of events that already had been set in
motion by the early 1950s.
It was not merely the laws that Bricker worried were taking
hold; it was the perceived—and perhaps growing—legitimacy of
using international human rights ideas within the domestic
setting. The fact that judges were even discussing the merits of
the domestic use of international human rights law was in fact
a major problem for Bricker. And even if Fujii was the only case
that had up until that moment been willing to use international
human rights law to invalidate a domestic law, it was a sign of
a possible shift, one that could make significant progress toward
defining the domestic acceptance of human rights even before
the Covenant was completed. If other courts, for instance,
followed the Fujii Court’s interpretation of international human
rights law, so too might public opinion, domestic legislation, and
institutional structures.112 Bricker was therefore not just
looking forward, but was reacting to events that had already
transpired.
The goal of Bricker and others like him was to discredit this
emergent notion of applying international human rights in the
domestic context, while impugning its advocates, gathering
supporters, and creating a legal bulwark against the domestic
impact of international human rights law. Thus, when Bricker
spoke to the United States Senate about loss of sovereignty, his
arguments were not abstract or hypothetical. Rather, they were

109. See generally Alona E. Evans, Some Aspects of the Problem of SelfExecuting Treaties, 45 AM. SOC’Y INT’L. L. PROC. 66 (1951) (discussing the
impact of international legislation such as the Genocide Convention on domestic
law); Quincy Wright, National Courts and Human Rights–The Fujii Case, 45
AM. J. INT’L L. 62 (1951) (discussing the tension between non-self-executing
treaties and domestic law in courts in the United States).
110. See Evans, supra note 109; Wright, supra note 109.
111. See Kaufman & Whiteman, supra note 42, at 309, 316.
112. Although historians of human rights generally focus on the way
international treaty provisions define what human rights are, the functional
meaning of human rights in practice is must include the conceptual
interpretations that occur at the local level.
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focused on a specific series of events that had transpired over the
past several years. In particular, Bricker made it quite clear that
the Fujii case was a primary concern during his Congressional
statements, stating: “I do not agree that the determination of the
court in the Fujii case is a proper judicial decision.”113
Bricker’s solution was to create a legal blockade against
international human rights law with his constitutional
amendment. In February 1952, for instance, when discussing his
own Senate Joint Resolution 130 (“S.J. Res. 130”), he described
the purpose of the amendment with explicit reference to the
Fujii case.114 He explained that in Fujii “a California court held
that the State’s Alien Land Law was repealed by article 55 of the
UN Charter.”115 Thus, he continued, one of the chief purposes of
S.J. Res. 130 was to “prevent treaties from automatically
becoming the supreme law of the land and thereby nullifying an
indeterminable amount of Federal and State legislation without
further action by the Congress.”116 While much of the talk of the
effect of international human rights law had been speculative,
Fujii provided Bricker with a tangible example of what might
happen in the United States if the trend towards incorporation
continued.
B. FUJII AND LOCAL HUMAN RIGHTS STRUGGLES
One crucial, and often overlooked, aspect of this history is
that the issue of human rights is not merely an international
issue. Human rights are necessarily and simultaneously a
domestic concern.117 The Fujii case shows that the struggles over
international human rights actually pertain to existing and
future domestic concerns. In the early 1950s both sides of the
human rights debate had significant stakes in the outcomes
regarding whether international human rights would be
incorporated into the domestic law.118 Thus, establishing a
lasting conception of human rights as domestic law had just as

113. 97 CONG. REC. 11,512 (1951).
114. 98 CONG. REC. 911 (1952).
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. See, e.g., Mark Goodale, Locating Rights, Envisioning Laws Between the
Global and the Local, in THE PRACTICE OF HUMAN RIGHTS: TRACKING LAW
BETWEEN THE GLOBAL AND THE LOCAL 25–26 (Mark Goodale & Sally Engle
Merry eds., 2007).
118. See id. at 17–33.
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many political consequences for those aggrieved parties and
individuals who had been seeking its admittance as it did for the
future of those who were actively fighting against it. Though
often overlooked, this domestic aspect of human rights—even
their domestic rejection—is an integral part of the human rights
concept formation process.
Bricker, for instance, argued a great deal about the loss of
sovereignty.119 In the abstract, however, sovereignty does not
offer much analytic purchase for understanding the particular
situation in question. The real question for Bricker—and what
was so deeply troubling to him—was not simply the necessity of
relinquishing sovereignty under an international system of
human rights, but it was the question of who would be bound
and by what authority.120 He maintained:
The basic premise of the so-called new international law
is that the relationship between citizens of the same
government and between the individual and his
government are appropriate subjects for negotiation,
definition, and enforcement in multilateral treaties.
Under this theory of the function of international law, no
economic or political rights are beyond the reach of the
treaty-making power.121
In this regard, the relation that human rights implied
between the domestic and international realms was of great
concern. Seizing upon the language of the State Department’s
reports, Bricker turned the government’s language around for
his own argument that the State Department was “promoting
this revolutionary legal theory by statements that the distinction
between foreign and domestic affairs is virtually nonexistent.”122
A close read of Bricker’s arguments is particularly
illuminating in showing just how locally-driven his arguments
about human rights and sovereignty actually were. “If the Fujii
case should eventually be affirmed by the United States
Supreme Court,” Bricker warned, “literally thousands of Federal
and State laws will automatically become invalid.”123 If human
rights treaties were incorporated into domestic law, he
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

98 CONG. REC. 911 (1952).
Id. at 908–09.
Id.
Id. at 909 (emphasis added).
Id. at 911.
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continued, the nation might be forced “to provide equal rights for
women. Obviously, something must be done to prevent treaties
from having such far-reaching and unintended consequences.”124
Of course, such consequences of incorporating human rights law
into domestic law were fully intended by many who had failed to
achieve the justice they felt they deserved under the United
States Constitution. A brief look at the kinds of social issues at
stake in the cases in which plaintiffs had looked toward
international human rights law, for instance, shows a series of
ongoing battles over local legal issues, such as antimiscegenation laws, racially restrictive covenants, and alien
land ownership laws.125
Bricker was quite correct about the necessity of having to
relinquish a certain amount of sovereignty if international
human rights were to be admitted into domestic law. Although
Bricker and others thought this was one of the worst things that
could happen to the American republic, as a practical matter, the
necessity of relinquishing a certain amount of freedom when
creating new laws is entirely unremarkable. Just as business
regulations and criminal laws limit the freedom to pollute or
commit murder, for instance, human rights laws similarly must
restrict certain conduct if they are to work. Bricker warned
about the effects of accepting a domestic notion of human rights
by offering specific examples of the local social consequences.126
Exaggeration, fabrication, and scare tactics were common in his
impassioned rhetoric. He claimed that international human
rights would suppress or deny Americans the freedom of
religion, the right to a public trial, freedom of speech,
association, and “the right of the United States to protect itself
against the subversive activities of Communists.”127
Bricker’s inflammatory rhetoric was effective. Many citizens
who were already invested in various local political battles took
naturally and rapidly to Senator Bricker’s call to arms and
became his allies.128 Human rights, though initiating from
124. Id. At the time, there were several proposed constitutional amendments
intended to ensure gender equality within the United States. Bricker mentioned
one such proposed amendment by name, Senate Joint Resolution 3, in his
discussion of the dangers of the Fujii case. Id.
125. See Lockwood, supra note 94 (discussing cases in state and federal
courts from 1946 to 1955 where plaintiffs raised the application of UN Charter
human rights provisions).
126. 98 CONG. REC. 911–12 (1952).
127. Id. at 909.
128. See Richards, supra note 42, at 203–04.
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international texts, appeared to them as just another local
threat to the local battles they were fighting. While these
struggles spurred some Americans to look toward human rights
for relief, others took it upon themselves to prevent human
rights from reaching domestic shores.129 By the early 1950s,
completely wiping human rights treaties off the books was not
possible—the United Nations had made too much progress and
had too much forward momentum at this point to halt it. Thus
the only option for domestic opponents of human rights was to
define them for the American public in a way that was as
consistent as possible with their local-level political aims and
goals.
C. THE RELEVANCE OF FUJII FOR SENATOR BRICKER
The legal and political aspects of the Bricker episode are
extremely important pieces of the overall story of human rights
concept formation in the United States. But the Fujii case helps
to illustrate the broader consequences of this episode in terms of
the development of the United States’ contemporary domestic
conception of human rights. Bricker and his allies were not just
fighting against the Covenant or for a Constitutional
amendment; they were fighting for a lasting conception of
human rights for the United States—one that would continue to
do Bricker’s work long after he and the particulars of the
struggle were forgotten. The Fujii case helps illuminate this
aspect of the story because what was at stake was whether rights
would flow into the United States from the international realm.
Bricker was fighting for an international-only conception of
human rights in which rights could flow from the United States
into the international realm, he argued, but not the other way
around.130
Although we know Bricker opposed human rights treaties,
it is incorrect to say he opposed human rights. Senator Bricker,
in fact, on numerous occasions advocated strongly on behalf of
“human rights.”131 But as the following quotes show, his brand
of human rights was quite different than that which was
embodied within the Covenant on Human Rights. In July 1951
he said on the floor of the Senate:

129. See id. at 203–06.
130. 97 CONG. REC. 8255 (1951).
131. Id. at 8255, 11,514.
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Our constant effort . . . ought to be to lift the other
peoples of the world up to our high standard of individual
human rights, rather than in any way to qualify our
standard, or to agree with any position which other
governments might take, or seek to have us take which
have the effect of lowering it.132
For Bricker, human rights sprang from the United States
Constitution, not an international treaty. He argued that it
would be possible for the United States to “play a leading part in
advancing the cause of human rights all over the world.”133 But
those human rights, as far as he was concerned, had to originate
within the Constitution.134 Within his understanding of the
matter, the slightest departure from the Constitution made any
external human rights treaty null and void.
We should try to convince the other nations of the world
that neither communism nor socialism is the wave of the
future . . . we should try to spread the doctrine that
human rights can be achieved only by adhering to the
principles embodied in the Constitution of the United
States and in the Declaration of Independence. By
precept and example we strengthen ourselves and can
best guide others to nobler concepts of human rights.135
A key insight emerges: Bricker actually supported human
rights, though a version of human rights that originated within
the provisions of the Constitution and emanated out, beyond the
borders of the United States rather than the other way around.
Thus, Bricker was not against human rights, but was fighting
for a particular conception of them. The meaning of human
rights for the present and future generations was what was at
stake within the context of this struggle. To the extent that we,
in the present, fail to appreciate the historical origins of our own
contemporary human rights concept, it is quite possible that we
might become unwitting collaborators of those who invented it
in the past.

132.
133.
134.
135.

Id. at 8255.
Id. at 11,514.
Id.
Id.
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III.

A VANQUISHED SOCIAL MOVEMENT

For those studying the history of human rights, it is easy to
let characters such as Senator John Bricker take control of the
story. Bricker was a larger than life individual with missionary
zeal, legions of supporters, great power, and outsized influence
over public matters. But focusing on his personality and
biographical details is not particularly useful for answering the
broad questions about contemporary conceptions of human
rights in the United States. Instead, it is more useful to focus on
what Bricker represented in context. That is, it is important to
focus the inquiry on examining the particular historical setting
that informed the ideas and proposals that Bricker put forth; to
consider the structural conditions that enabled him to gain such
support at the time; and to use his story to learn about this
extremely unique and defining moment in United States history.
One topic of debate that was raised repeatedly by Senator
Bricker was the threat of something he called “world
government.” To Bricker, the Covenant, human rights treaties,
Fujii, and the United Nations were each part of a scheme for
world government. “According to this scheme,” Bricker argued,
“we are to be a state in a great nation of states, with our destiny
not shaped by ourselves, but by a super government.”136 The
inflammatory nature of Bricker’s rhetoric is clear in the
statements he used to describe world government:
Our Government, our educational system, our trade and
commerce, our own domestic laws, the control of our
Armies, Navies, and Air Forces are to be given
completely to this super-world-government, all in the
name of preserving peace. Is that the kind of peace the
builders of this great Nation want? Is peace so sweet that
we are willing to be made slaves in order to obtain it?137
Interestingly, his accusations were not strictly partisan. He
explained in his speech to the Senate that both “Republicans and
Democrats are included among those who would convert the
United Nations into an instrument of world government by the
use of treaties.”138

136. Id. at 12,294.
137. Id.
138. 98 CONG. REC. 909 (1952).
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Bricker’s answer to the impending threat of world
government, of course, was his Constitutional amendment.
Before the United States “is engulfed by some form of world or
regional government,” Bricker warned, “the American people
must, admittedly, take that revolutionary step, by amending the
Constitution.”139 Though Bricker did not shy away from scare
tactics, looking back at this history from our own contemporary
perspective it is difficult to know where his embellishments end
and the truth begins. After all, the phrase “world government”
means far less, if anything, to us today than it did in the postWorld War II context. This section places Bricker’s rhetoric
about world government in its context and explores the
constellation of proposed ideas, laws, and institutions
surrounding the overlooked and unsuccessful, yet highly
influential, world government movement.
A. CHANCELLOR HUTCHINS AND A PLAN FOR WORLD
GOVERNMENT
When Bricker first submitted S. Res. 177 in July 1951, he
lambasted a report on freedom of the press that was authored by
Chancellor Robert Hutchins of the University of Chicago.140
Hutchins was a public figure in American politics, public affairs,
and academia who was at the time well known in popular
conversation.141 Hutchins was not one to retreat from potential
controversy; in fact, he preferred to author it. Hutchins headed
a commission that had been created to study the issue of freedom
of the press. The Commission of Freedom of the Press (“the
Commission”) was well-appointed in funds and in notable public
figures. The Commission’s Report was financed with grants of
$200,000 from Time, Inc. and $15,000 from Encyclopedia
Britannica, Inc.142 These, of course, were extremely significant
figures for any such endeavor, but particularly so for a project
that was primarily academic in nature.
Many of the notable public figures who joined Hutchins on
the Commission worked in political posts and for causes that

139. Id. at 911.
140. 97 CONG. REC. 8254–68 (1951).
141. See generally MILTON MAYER, ROBERT MAYNARD HUTCHINS: A MEMOIR
255 (John H. Hicks ed., 1993) (discussing the life and career of Robert Hutchins).
142. THE COMM’N ON FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, A FREE AND RESPONSIBLE
PRESS (1947).
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Bricker opposed.143 Some Commission members, for example,
had been part of Franklin Roosevelt’s administration. For
instance, Archibald Macleish was an American member of
UNESCO’s governing board, and was responsible for writing the
preamble to its 1945 Constitution.144 Several years earlier, he
directed the Office of Facts and Figures (later the Office of War
Information), and was appointed by Franklin Roosevelt to chair
a committee charged with outlining his Four Freedoms in
1942145—a precursor idea to human rights that appears in the
UDHR’s preamble.146 In this latter task, Macleish was joined by
another Commission member, Reinhold Niebuhr. Additional
members of the Commission, such as Zechariah Chafee and
Jacques Maritain, worked and advocated for the UN and human
rights.147
But what is most noteworthy, and directly relates to the
context of Bricker’s fierce rhetoric surrounding world
government, is the fact that there were a number of individuals
on the Commission who had been arguing that the United
Nations was not strong enough or acceptable in its then-present
form.148 Although Bricker made similar arguments, these
individuals had a very different solution. Instead of relying on
the United Nations to attain and preserve international peace
143. For a list of members, see id. Note that the list of Commission members
appears on an unnumbered page at the beginning of the text.
144. About the U.S. and UNESCO, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE,
http://www.state.gov/p/io/unesco/usunesco/ (last visited Nov. 5, 2016).
145. Herbert Mitgang, Books of The Times; A Poet Who Also Held a High
TIMES
(June
3,
1992),
Government
Rank,
N.Y.
http://www.nytimes.com/1992/06/03/books/books-of-the-times-a-poet-who-alsoheld-a-high-government-rank.html.
146. Eleanor Roosevelt and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
ROOSEVELT FOUR FREEDOMS, http://www.fourfreedoms.nl/en/roosevelt-fourfreedoms/eleanor-roosevelt-and-the-universal-declaration-of.htm (last visited
Nov. 5, 2016).
147. See Milton, supra note 141, at 257–58.
148. For example, American banker Beardsley Ruml is famously known to
have said the following:
At the end of five years you will consider the United Nations is the
greatest vision ever realized by man. At the end of ten years you will
find doubts within yourself and all through the world. At the end of
fifty years you will believe the United Nations cannot succeed. You will
be certain that all the odds are against its ultimate life and success. It
will only be when the United Nations is 100 years old that we will
know that the United Nations is the only alternative to the demolition
of the world.
WILLIAM SHAWCROSS, DELIVER US FROM EVIL: PEACEKEEPERS, WARLORDS AND
A WORLD OF ENDLESS CONFLICT 224 (2000).
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and security, these Commission members advocated disbanding
the United Nations and creating a stronger, truly supranational
from of government. For example, Beardsley Ruml, who was
Chairman of the Board of the department store R.H. Macy and
Company and had been the Chairman of the Federal Reserve
Bank of New York, was a strong advocate of such a plan.149
Other Commission members were members of another
Committee that Hutchins headed, the Committee to Frame a
World Constitution (the “Committee”). This second group was
dedicated to researching, promoting, and enacting plans for
what they called “world government”—the very same world
government that Bricker was advocating against in the
Senate.150 The Commission members who were or had been
associated with the eleven-member Committee included Robert
Redfield, William K. Hocking, Reinhold Niebuhr, and of course,
Robert Hutchins, who was the head of both groups.151
Hutchins’ Committee to Frame a World Constitution was
responsible for publishing a monthly world government journal
called Common Cause that by the end of 1951 had published over
two thousand pages for its subscribers.152 But, more
importantly, they were also responsible—and better known—for
authoring a complex draft “World Constitution” that outlined in
rich detail the institutional structure and composition of a new
world order, as well as all of the associated rights and duties of
the “world citizens” living beneath their invented system of
global governance.153 It was this type of “world constitution” that
Bricker spoke of at length in his congressional statements.
Hutchins’ World Constitution (the “Chicago Plan”)
contained a “Declaration of Duties and Rights” that included
provisions for the stewardship of the “four elements of life—
earth, water, air, energy.”154 The Chicago Plan divided the world
into “nine Societies of kindred nations and cultures, or
149. See Guide to the Beardsley Ruml Papers 1917-1960, UNIV. OF CHI.
LIBR.,
https://www.lib.uchicago.edu/e/scrc/findingaids/view.php?eadid=ICU.SPCL.RU
ML&q=bank#idp125585296 (last visited Nov. 21, 2016).
150. See 97 CONG. REC. 8257 (1951).
151. Preliminary Draft of a World Constitution, supra note 5, at 38. Only
Hutchins and Redfield themselves were on the Committee.
152. See COMM. TO FRAME A WORLD CONSTITUTION, COMMON CAUSE: A
MONTHLY REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE TO FRAME A WORLD CONSTITUTION
(1947).
153. See Preliminary Draft of a World Constitution, supra note 5.
154. See id. at 6.
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Regions . . . “ with names such as “Europa,” “Eurasia,” “Afrasia,”
“Atlantis,” “Asia Major,” “Austrasia,” and “Columbia.”155 The
World Constitution invalidated any region’s law that ran
contrary to it.156
Although Bricker did not mention it in his Senate speech,
he undoubtedly would have been very much aware that
Hutchins was intimately involved in the project to develop a
world constitution. As described in detail below, it was a fact
that had come up for discussion in many previous Senate and
House debates.157 Nor would Bricker have needed to mention
what was well known to his Senate colleagues: Hutchins’ plan
for world government was but one of a great number of plans
that advocated for restructuring the United Nations, or doing
away with it altogether, and in its place instituting a world
government. In the fall of 1951 several dozen of these plans had
been drafted into resolutions and were awaiting their fate in the
United States Congress.158
As improbable as they seem today, all of these resolutions
sought to transform the relationship the United States and its
citizens held with the rest of the world, either by transforming
the United Nations or through an entirely new supranational
governmental institution. Doing so would require substantial
reform and would require the United States to relinquish a
major portion of its sovereignty. A number of the plans even
called for amending the United States Constitution, though
years before Bricker had put forth the idea for very different
purposes.159 Although Bricker’s rhetoric today appears alarmist
when placed in a contextual vacuum, for all of his liberal
embellishments, Bricker actually downplayed the nature and
extent of what was actually occurring at the time concerning the
issue of world government.

155. Id. at 11–12.
156. Id. at 25–26.
157. See Section III(B), infra.
158. See Section III(C), infra.
159. For a comprehensive list of resolutions which did and did not envisage
changes in the United States Constitution, see William Tucker Dean, Jr., World
Government and the Constitution of the United States, 38 CAL. L. REV. 452
(1950).
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B. NATIONAL POLITICAL SUPPORT FOR WORLD GOVERNMENT
When Bricker introduced his resolutions in July and
September of 1951, he was acting within a unique, though
unstable, political and social context. Over the past several
years, “world government” supporters had made a series of
sweeping advances surrounding the question of how to organize
the post-war world. They had, for instance, made significant
inroads into all three branches of the United States’ federal
government.160 For a number of years, Congress had been
considering how to deal with a number of legislative proposals
that advocated for various forms of world government or UN
transformation.161 A reluctant and cautious Truman
administration was also trying to figure out its path forward in
the face of growing support for such ideas.162 The courts at this
time also appeared to be moving towards ideas of international
human rights law in a way that they had never before (or again)
done. It is within this contextual backdrop of considerable
national advances toward world government Bricker was
operating. Because existing human rights scholarship has failed
to account for much of the basic facts surrounding this historical
episode, this Section offers a resource-rich outlay of historical
data, providing extensive examples of the legislation, the
politics, and the court cases that emerged.
After 1945, a series of proposed laws and court cases had
embraced the core idea of this budding internationalist trend
that advocated for greater United States participation in global
institutions and international sources of law. By 1948, a variety
of individuals, groups, and organizations had advanced a wide
range of often-revolutionary proposals; there were several dozen
resolutions under consideration in the House of Representatives,

160. See, e.g., id. (detailing the host of legislative resolutions then pending
before the 81st Congress); id. at 459 (describing the Atlantic Union Committee,
led by distinguished judges Mr. Justice Roberts, Judge Robert P. Patterson, and
former Undersecretary of State Will Clayton); see generally Campbell Craig,
Why World Government Failed After World War II: A Historical Lesson for
Contemporary Efforts, in GLOBAL GOVERNANCE, GLOBAL GOVERNMENT 77 (Luis
Cabrera ed., 2011) (explaining President Truman’s initial interest in, and
eventual rejection of, world government).
161. See generally Dean, Jr., supra note 159 (describing various resolutions
introduced in the United States Congress during the 1940s).
162. See generally Craig, supra note 160 (illustrating the political and social
context in which the Truman Administration was operating).
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with many more in the works.163 Although many were similar to
one another, there was also significant variation. The legislative
proposals ranged from relatively modest suggestions to work
within the confines of the United Nations to honor its core
principles, to the amendment of the UN Charter to facilitate
sweeping structural changes, to the wholesale rejection of the
United Nations in place of a supranational so-called “world
government” (see Table 1). In 1948, there was enough agitation
and lobbying on the matter to gain the attention and support of
a growing group of lawmakers in the House and Senate of the
United States Congress.164
By 1948, the issue of UN reform and world government had
become prominent enough that the House Committee on Foreign
Affairs held hearings on the matter in May 1948 to closely
examine and consider the legislative proposals before it.165 The
House Committee on Foreign Affairs again held hearings on the
matter in October 1949.166 And after establishing a Senate
Foreign Relations subcommittee on the “Revision of the United
Nations Charter” to study the issue and examine the growing
number of resolutions, the Senate subcommittee held its own
hearings in February 1950.167
An extraordinary amount of time and resources were
focused on the hearings. Together, the hearings spanned nearly
three weeks, during which time the House and Senate
committees and subcommittees conducted interviews, heard oral
testimony, and received written communication from over 351
individuals and groups, amassing over 1,600 pages of

163. General United States Policy Toward the United Nations, in FOREIGN
RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1948, GENERAL; THE UNITED NATIONS,
VOLUME I, PART 1, at 22 n.3 (Ralph R. Goodwin ed., 1948) [hereinafter General
United States Policy Toward the United Nations].
164. Id.
165. See Structure of the United Nations and the Relations of the U.S. to the
United Nations: Hearings Before the H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 80th Cong.
(1948).
166. See To Seek Development of the United Nations into a World Federation:
Hearings Before the Comm. on Foreign Affairs H. Rep., 81st Cong. (1949).
167. See Resolutions Relative to Revision of the United Nations Charter,
Atlantic Union, World Federation, Etc.: Hearings Before the Subcomm. of the S.
Comm. on Foreign Relations, 81st Cong. (1950) [hereinafter 81st Cong.
Subcomm. Hearings]. For a more in-depth look at the official documentary
record of United States policy decisions regarding the United Nations, see
FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1950, THE UNITED NATIONS; THE
WESTERN HEMISPHERE, VOLUME II (Ralph R. Goodwin et al. eds., 1976).
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documentation.168 Several months after the Senate Hearings,
the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations issued a sixty-fourpage report (the “Senate Report”) that provided a synthesis of
the proposals as well as an overview of the 1950 hearings to
assist lawmakers in their understanding of the issues and
proposals before them.169
The Senate Report recognized that in recent years there had
been a “loss of confidence” in the UN from many quarters.170
After World War II, the authors explained, achieving lasting
international peace and security was of paramount concern.171
In 1950, preventing another global war, of course, remained just
as pressing a concern as ever, but the authors explained that in
just a few years a number of momentous obstacles had emerged;
the world in 1950 was quite different from the one that the
architects of the UN had confronted in 1945.172 For one, the
organization and its founding document—the UN Charter—
were both constructed before the public at large knew about
atomic energy.173 The power that was unleashed over Japan in
the waning days of World War II was an unforeseen
technological development. In 1950, the Soviet Union possessed
the same technology.174 At this point, the organization that the
nations of the world had put their faith in for mitigating the
threat of war did not possess the laws or mechanisms for
controlling the proliferation and use of this potentially
devastating weaponry.175
The threat of atomic warfare was compounded by the
political tensions that had emerged between the United States

168. See 81st Cong. Subcomm. Hearings, supra note 167.
169. See S. REP. NO. 2501 (1950).
170. Id. at 10.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 6–8.
173. The United Nations was officially formed in June 1945, while the first
atomic bomb was not dropped on Hiroshima until August 6, 1945. See History
http://www.un.org/en/
of
the
United
Nations,
UNITED NATIONS,
sections/history/history-united-nations/ (last visited Oct. 28, 2016); Atomic
Bomb Dropped on Hiroshima, HISTORY, http://www.history.com/this-day-inhistory/atomic-bomb-dropped-on-hiroshima (last visited Nov. 6, 2016).
174. Soviets Explode Atomic Bomb, HISTORY, http://www.history.com/thisday-in-history/soviets-explode-atomic-bomb (last visited Nov. 6, 2016).
175. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, opened for
signature July 1, 1968, 21 U.S.T. 483, 729 U.N.T.S. 161; Seth Grae, The Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty’s Obligation to Transfer Peaceful Nuclear Energy
Technology: One Proposal of a Technology, 19 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1985, 1989
(1995).
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and the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union’s repeated use of its veto
in the Security Council brought to light the divergent—if not
mutually exclusive—political interests of the two nations.176 It
also prevented the United Nations from addressing and acting
upon important international matters on its agenda. In these
early days of the Cold War, the Senate Report acknowledged
that the United Nations was an absolute necessity if the world
was not to descend into anarchy.177 But at the same time, the
Senate Report acknowledged that there were serious questions
about whether the United Nations was strong enough to carry
out the original mission its architects had set out for it—or
whether the UN could even endure.178 Referencing the
ideological nature of the Cold War, the authors of the Report
wrote that the “positive advantages [of the UN] must, of course,
be measured against the question as to how long the
organization can survive the increasing pervasiveness and
intensity of the ideological struggle for the minds and loyalties
of men.”179 The challenges confronting the United Nations were
formidable.
The authors of the Senate Report wrote that it was obvious
that there needed to be some kind of action or change by the UN
to address these problems. Lawmakers, State Department
officials, and engaged members of the public all recognized that
business as normal at the UN could not be a lasting solution for
international peace and security. The authors of the Senate
Report wrote: “[T]he point does not need to be labored that the
United States should do what it can to maintain and strengthen
the United Nations.”180 Indeed, it was not just the United States
that recognized these problems; those closest to the day-to-day
political challenges within the UN also recognized the extent of
its internal divisions. In 1948, for example, the UN’s own
Secretary General, Trygve Lie, admitted that the “wartime
alliance from which the United Nations was born started to pull
176. For example, following the extension of emergency aid to the Greek
Government by the United States and paralysis of Security Council action by
Soviet veto, the United States brought the case before the General Assembly in
1947. Primarily as a result of Soviet obstructionism it was at that time
impossible to reach an agreement on the plan for international control of atomic
energy approved by a majority of United Nations members. S. REP. No. 2501, at
10–11 (1950).
177. Id. at 6–8, 16–17.
178. Id. at 8–9, 17–18.
179. Id. at 17.
180. Id. at 18.
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apart all too quickly and, had the establishment of the United
Nations been delayed even a few months, the Organization
might never have been created.”181 The most pressing question
for United States lawmakers and State Department officials was
what kind of institutional changes were necessary and
appropriate.
Until that time, the Truman administration and various
members of Congress had begun to explore two very distinct
paths for addressing the UN’s difficulties. The first was to work
within the framework of the United Nations—though proposals
differed on whether it was best to amend the Charter, and by
extension the structure of the organization, or to leave it as it
was. The second path, recognizing the deficiencies and inherent
limitations of the UN, was to develop laws, international
institutions, and relationships outside of the organization. The
Vandenberg Resolution—a resolution that had already received
a favorable reception in the Senate—recommended heading
along both avenues simultaneously.182 It called not only for the
United States to work within the framework of the United
Nations to achieve peace, but also for regional security
arrangements outside of the UN’s framework.183
One-part idealism and one-part realism, the Vandenberg
Resolution mirrored the uncertainty and the separate directions
taken by the many competing legislative proposals then being
considered. For the most part, though, these other proposals
expanded liberally on each of the paths already taken by
Vandenberg and his resolution’s supporters, offering to take the
nation far afield of where it already was. It remained quite
uncertain to all whether the best hopes for lasting international
peace and security resided within the UN or in a separate
institutional framework.
The resolutions before Congress spanned a broad range.184
There were, for instance, plans to strengthen the UN by altering
181. Introduction to the Secretary-General’s Third Annual Report, U.N.
GAOR, 3d Sess., Supp.1, U.N. Doc. A/565 (July 5, 1948), reprinted in PUBLIC
PAPERS OF THE SECRETARIES-GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS, VOLUME 1:
TRYGVE LIE 1946–1953, 137–38 (Andrew W. Cordier & Wilder Foote eds., 1969).
182. Hearings on the Vandenberg Resolution and the North Atlantic Treaty
took place over the course of twelve days in 1948 and 1949. See The Vandenberg
Resolution and the North Atlantic Treaty: Hearings Held in Executive Session
Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 80th and 81st Cong. (1948–49).
183. See, e.g., id. at 1, 93.
184. Table 1 groups each of the then-pending resolutions into separate
categories (calls for a world government; calls to strengthen the UN by

44

MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT'L LAW [Vol. 26:1

the rules surrounding the veto, by establishing armament
regulations or security provisions.185 There were proposals to
work outside of the United Nations to establish regional
Unions,186 and finally there were many proposals that advocated
the creation of a world government.187
During each of the congressional hearings on UN reform
and world government, the Truman administration sent
representatives
to
testify
before
the
congressional
committees.188 In these hearings, the Truman administration
quickly acknowledged there were a number of obstacles before
the UN and its member states.189 It also recognized that there
was significant interest among lawmakers and members of the
American public about the matter, how to address it, and the
sizeable consequences that resided with any course of action.190
Secretary of State George C. Marshall said to the House
Committee in May of 1948:
The interest shown by the great majority of Americans
in the United Nations and in increasing its effectiveness
is an impressive fact. A vast amount of thought is being
devoted throughout our country to means of furthering
the objectives of the Charter in the prevailing world
circumstances. The attitude of the United States towards
the problems of the United Nations will have a profound
effect on the future of the organization.191
Throughout this period, the State Department officials, not
surprisingly, maintained a strict policy stance of opposing any

amending the UN Charter; calls to work within the confines of the UN; and calls
for regional federalism) into separate categories, and outlines their nature by
providing a brief description of each.
185. See id. at II.
186. See id. at IV.
187. See id. at I.
188. STAFF OF S. COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 81ST CONG., REP. OF THE
COMMITTEE ON RESOLUTIONS RELATIVE TO REVISION OF THE UNITED NATIONS
CHARTER, ATLANTIC UNION, WORLD FEDERATION, AND SIMILAR PROPOSALS 3
(Comm. Print 1950) (“The subcommittee, in the second phase of its hearings,
heard the testimony of the Department of State on each of the resolutions.”).
189. 81st Cong. Subcomm. Hearings, supra note 167, at 1.
190. See, e.g., id. at 101–02 (discussing public support or Resolution No. 56),
118 (discussing the potential consequences of a war with Russia).
191. General United States Policy Toward the United Nations, supra note
163, at 22.
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emergent proposals to alter the UN Charter or establish a world
government in its place.192
In retrospect, there are two aspects of this historical period
that are particularly noteworthy. The first is that there were
major concerns about the United Nations and its ability to
function. The Truman administration, members of Congress,
and the American public were largely in agreement on this
particular issue.193 The most effective solution, however, was
certainly a matter of intense debate. Marshall, outlining the
Truman administration’s position, explained to the House
Committee:
The United Nations was created after years of study and
after many months of difficult negotiations. It now has
58 members. It is the symbol of the aspirations of
mankind . . . Let us not in our impatience and our fears
sacrifice the hard-won gains that we now possess in the
United Nations organization.194
The second noteworthy aspect of this historical moment is
that even the most seemingly far-fetched proposals for world
government enjoyed support from serious, respected, powerful
members of the public and the United States government.195
Amazingly, the State Department felt compelled to address even
the most fantastic plans for world government. Indeed, the
majority of these proposals no doubt appear outlandish to the
modern observer—as many apparently did to many observers at
the time. But the point here is not to assess whether they
192. See id. at 27–28. See also General United States-United Nations
Relations, in FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1950, THE UNITED
NATIONS; THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE, VOLUME II, at 4–5 (Ralph R. Goodwin et
al. eds., 1976) [hereinafter General United States-United Nations Relations]
(discussing the position of State Department officials opposing revision of the
UN Charter or establishing other forms of world government).
193. General United States Policy Toward the United Nations, supra note
163, at 22 (“The interest shown by the great majority of Americans in the United
Nations and in increasing its effectiveness is an impressive fact.”).
194. Id. at 28.
195. See, e.g., S. Con. Res. 52, 81st Cong. (1949) (the Thomas-Douglas or
“Article 51” resolution), S. Con. Res. 56, 81st Cong. (1949) (the Tobey or “World
Federalist” resolution), S. Res. 133, 81st Cong. (1949) (the Sparkman resolution
or the “ABC proposal”), S. Con. Res. 57, 81st Cong. (1949) (the Kefauver or
“Atlantic Union” resolution), S. Con. Res. 66, 81st Cong. (1949) (the Taylor or
“World Constitution” resolution), and S. Con. Res. 12, 81st Cong. (1949) (the
Fulbright – Thomas or “European Federation” resolution); see also General
United States-United Nations Relations, supra note 192, at 4.
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possessed any merit or how likely they were to succeed; it is to
document a contextual reality and to show that the range of
possible solutions for the issues of human organization was, in
the minds of many, far broader and more open to such
possibilities than it is now. Even with the State Department’s
lack of enthusiasm for virtually all of the existing world
government proposals, advocates for institutional change had
made significant political inroads in the Congress. Their
greatest political and legislative successes, however, were at the
state level.
C. STATE POLITICAL SUPPORT FOR WORLD GOVERNMENT
By 1950, states had adopted resolutions in favor of world
government.196 Many of the states that passed or considered
such resolutions used similar language in their resolutions.
There were a number of different resolutions of varying
strengths and emphases circulating in state legislatures. Rather
than passing world government resolutions outright, some
states took initial steps to study the issue before taking any
decisive action on the matter. For example, on May 6, 1949, the
Maryland General Assembly—that state’s legislative body—
approved Senate Joint Resolution 23 (“S.J. Res. 23”): “Joint
Resolution requesting the Governor of Maryland to appoint a
Commission to study the advisability of the State of Maryland
urging the United States to take the initiative in strengthening
the United Nations Organization.”197
Under the provisions of S.J. Res. 23, Maryland’s General
Assembly called on the Governor to establish a commission that
was to be comprised of at least ten members: two from the
Maryland judiciary, four from the Maryland State Assembly,
and the remainder to be selected from the state of Maryland at
large.198 The resolution recognized the same public mood
evidenced in the United States Congressional hearings. It
referenced a “world situation in which the fear of war is ever
present,” and cited a collective “sense of insecurity” the
background condition behind the measure.199 But the chief
concern as expressed in the resolution was “the lack of effective

196.
197.
198.
199.

See Table 1, infra.
S.J. Res. 23, 335th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Md. 1949).
Id.
Id.
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international law to govern the nations of the world.”200 Just as
the Truman administration and the United States Congress had
acknowledged, the text of the Resolution similarly suggested
that the United Nations was not equipped to address exigent
global circumstances.201 The Resolution noted within its text
that two other nearby states like Massachusetts and
Connecticut, as well as other “sister states,” had already decided
how to address these matters of global concern, namely, by
adopting measures that sought to strengthen the “United
Nations organization with a view of changing it from its present
powerless state . . . to the status of a strictly limited World
Federal Government.”202 The question to be placed before the
Maryland Commission was whether the state should join them.
It is important not to make too much of proposals like this
one in terms of it being a piece of legislation with legal teeth. The
Maryland Resolution only called for a committee to be created to
study the issue. If the commission reported favorably about the
matter of world government, then the issue might be placed on
the ballot in upcoming state elections. If the voters in turn
approved the world government resolution before them, then
depending on the precise wording of the ultimate resolution, the
Maryland State Assembly would urge those responsible for such
matters in the federal government to take necessary actions
toward strengthening the United Nations or establishing a
world government.
The state of Connecticut, as referenced in the Maryland
initiative, was a step or two ahead. The Connecticut State
legislature had already approved Connecticut Public Act No. 5:
“An Act Concerning Question Concerning Charter of United
Nations” several months earlier in 1948.203 After putting the
question to its citizens several months later, Connecticut voters
approved the initiative that appeared on their ballots as the
following proposition:
Do you, as a sovereign citizen of Connecticut and the
United States of America, direct our representatives in

200. Id.
201. STAFF OF S. COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 81ST CONG., REP. OF THE
COMMITTEE ON RESOLUTIONS RELATIVE TO REVISION OF THE UNITED NATIONS
CHARTER, ATLANTIC UNION, WORLD FEDERATION, AND SIMILAR PROPOSALS 11
(Comm. Print 1950).
202. Id.
203. 1948 Conn. Pub. Acts 21.
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the national congress to urge the president and the
congress to take the lead in calling for amendments to
the United Nations charter strengthening the United
Nations into a limited world federal government capable
of enacting, interpreting and enforcing laws to prevent
war?204

The text of this resolution was very similar to some of the many
non-binding resolutions that various states passed within their
legislatures. A standard example was that of New Hampshire’s
“Joint Resolution Relating to World Government” which was
approved on April 7, 1949.205 Its solution to the problems facing
the United Nations was to establish “a world federal
government, universal and strong enough to prevent armed
conflict between nations, and having direct jurisdiction over the
individual in those matters within its authority.”206 The
resolution directed its state representatives in the United States
Congress to:
[T]ake the initiative in requesting amendments to the
United Nations Charter strengthening the United
Nations into a limited world federal government capable
of enacting, interpreting and enforcing laws to prevent
war. The secretary of state is directed to send a copy of
this resolution to our representatives in the national
Congress, to the speaker of the national house of
representatives, to the president of the national senate
and to the President of the United States.207
In the spring of 1949, the Oklahoma legislature adopted a
much more strongly-worded resolution which could only take
effect if it received a majority of votes in the state’s referendum
elections the following year.208 This resolution was entitled
Senate Joint Resolution No. 3: “Amendment to Charter of the
United Nations.”209 The following text, which appeared on the
ballot, was a very brief, truncated version of the actual
resolution.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.

Id. at 21–22.
1949 N.H. Laws 526.
Id. at 525–26.
Id. at 526.
S.J. Res. 3, 22nd Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Okla. 1949).
Id.
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[I]t is the wish of the people of Oklahoma that the
delegates of the United States to the United Nations
propose or support amendments to the charter of the
United Nations which will strengthen the United
Nations and make it a world federal government able to
prevent war.210
Interestingly, the full resolution called for much stronger
institutional and legal provisions than what was conveyed in the
ballot measure. In part, it read:
WHEREAS, the security of the people of Oklahoma and
other States of the United States requires the
establishment of a supra-national authority with power
(1) to define “war crimes” and criminal acts menacing the
peace of the world; and (2) to cause the arrest and lawful
trial of persons accused of such crimes, and to provide for
the lawful punishment of persons thus convicted of such
crimes . . . WHEREAS, the Charter of the United
Nations does not provide for the establishment of a
supra-national authority possessing these powers.211
Although most of the states only adopted non-binding
resolutions, several states took a much more dramatic approach
to the issue.212 Instead of simply urging the appropriate
representatives to consider transforming the United Nations
into a world government, these states passed resolutions calling
for a constitutional convention to amend the United States
Constitution in order to require the creation and participation in
world government. For instance, in April 1949, the California
Assembly approved Joint Resolution No. 26: “Relative to the
Participation of the United States in a World Federal
Government.”213
The text of the resolution began like most of the other
resolutions, containing a basis of the issue and a description of
the perceived problem. In particular, it referenced the
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. See Burton Andrews, Amending the U.S. Constitution for Participation
in World Government, 4 LAW. & L. NOTES 21, 21 (1950–51) (stating that
legislatures in California, Connecticut, Florida, Maine, New Jersey, and North
Carolina all adopted resolutions asking Congress to call a convention to propose
an Amendment related to a world government).
213. S.J. Res. 26, 1949 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1949).

50

MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT'L LAW [Vol. 26:1

technological developments in atomic weaponry that had
appeared publicly only after the United Nations Charter was
drafted:
WHEREAS, war is now a threat to the very existence of
our civilization, because modem science has produced
weapons of war which are overwhelmingly destructive
and against which there is no sure defense.214
Similar to many other state resolutions, it suggested that the
United Nations was not in a position to be able to ensure
international peace and security:
WHEREAS, the United Nations, as presently
constituted, although accomplishing great good in many
fields, lacks authority to enact, interpret or enforce world
law, and under its present [C]harter is incapable of
restraining any major nations which may foster or
foment war.215
Resolution No. 26 referenced the fact that other states had
considered the issue and passed resolutions outlining a position
in favor of world government:
WHEREAS, many states have memorialized Congress,
through resolutions by their state legislatures or in
referenda by their voters, to initiate steps toward the
creation of a world federal government reserving to the
nations and to the people those rights not specifically
granted as necessary to the establishment of the
maintenance of world law and order.216
But unlike most of the others, to date, this resolution contained
the following text:
[N]ow, therefore, be it . . . Resolved, By the Assembly and
Senate of the State of California, jointly, [t]hat
application is hereby made to the Congress of the United
States, pursuant to Article V of the Constitution of the
United States, to call a convention for the sole purpose of
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id.
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proposing amendment of the Constitution to expedite
and insure the participation of the United States in a
world federal government, open to all nations, with
powers which, while defined and limited, shall be
adequate to preserve peace, whether the proposed
charter or constitution of such world federal government
be presented in the form of amendments to the [C]harter
of the United Nations, or by a world constitutional
convention, or otherwise.217
By taking stock of the legal failures that have heretofore
been overlooked by scholars, the entire Bricker narrative is now
turned on its head. Although Bricker is generally associated
with the idea to amend the Constitution to achieve his political
goals, the movement for world government actually began long
before him. Bricker was merely reacting to a similar, yet polar
opposite strategy of amendment. The first largescale attempts to
amend the Constitution were to require a radical, global
restructuring of the domestic and international realms.
Bricker’s attempt was designed to prevent it.
D. THE IMPACT OF THE WORLD GOVERNMENT MOVEMENT
Though this oft-forgotten movement was ultimately
unsuccessful, the historical record reveals the lasting effects of
its efforts. One of the primary consequences was to inspire the
political backlash of which Senator Bricker was a part. The
movement proposed a revolutionary restructuring of the United
States’ relationship with the rest of the world. Its ambitions
were extreme and readily challenged by opponents. In just a few
years, nearly every state that passed a world government
resolution rescinded it through formal legislative process. Ideas
for world government were quickly swept aside even by former
supporters.218
Yet while the new world order envisioned by world
government supporters did not materialize, several ideas
contained within the movement did take hold internationally.
Chief among these was the need for international institutions to
regulate the new state of affairs. As World War II was coming to
217. S.J. Res. 26, 1949 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1949).
218. See generally BARATTA, supra note 9, at 486 (explaining that the world
federalist movement declined rapidly after 1950, and that the states rescinded
their federalist resolutions).
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an end, the need to form international relationships beyond the
nation state was widely recognized.219 The United Nations is one
example of this need being met through the creation of an
intergovernmental organization. But it was also recognized that
the United Nations alone could not hold the weight of the world’s
geopolitical needs. For many in the United States during the late
1940s and early 1950s, world government was the solution to
this latter realization.
World government was, however, just one of many
responses to the problem. The idea of world government, though
defeated, contained the seeds of other lasting institutions that
emerged in its wake. The European Union, the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization, and the International Atomic Energy
Agency are just a few of the numerous institutions and measures
that emerged from this earlier impetus and that remain with us
today.220 Thus, the ideas contained within a failed movement
helped inspire the development of the contemporary structure of
international institutions.
Finally, the struggle between world government supporters
and their opponents inspired a compromise that sheds a clear
light on the contemporary conception of human rights in the
United States. To appease both supporters and opponents of a
stronger world order, political leaders reached a tacit agreement:
the United States would strongly support human rights in the
international arena, but not on domestic soil. Human rights
would solely be an export commodity: something for the United
States to offer its support internationally but conspicuously
absent from the domestic arena. In time, however, the domestic
absence of human rights lost its conspicuousness and became a
taken for granted reality. Few Americans are consciously aware
of the historical roots of this domestic void.
219. See generally EVAN LUARD, A HISTORY OF THE UNITED NATIONS
VOLUME 1: THE YEARS OF WESTERN DOMINATION, 1945-1955, at 21–25 (1982)
(discussing the post-World War II realization that many states had concerning
forming a supranational, conflict-mediating organization).
220. See DUNOFF ET AL., supra note 12, at 212 (stating that the Rome Treaty
that lead to the formation of the European Economic Community, now known
as the European Union, was ratified in 1957); A Short History of NATO, NATO,
http://www.nato.int/history/nato-history.html (last visited Nov. 7, 2016)
(stating that the North Atlantic Treaty was signed on 4 April, 1949); History,
INT’L ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, https://www.iaea.org/about/overview/history
(last visited Nov. 14, 2016) (stating that the “IAEA was created in 1957 in
response to the deep fears and expectations generated by the discoveries and
diverse uses of nuclear technology”).
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Given its lasting influence, it is perhaps surprising that
within the existing literature on the history of human rights, it
appears that the movement for world government never even
happened. As this Article has endeavored to illustrate, the
historical record is replete with evidence of the movement in
newspaper
articles,
Congressional
hearings,
debates,
resolutions, State Department records, books, magazine articles,
documents from state legislatures, and so forth, all lying hidden
in plain sight.221 And just as with the Bricker controversy, the
legacies of the world government movement abound.
IV.

LESSONS FROM LEGAL FAILURES

Through a largely neglected account of the struggles
involving a failed constitutional amendment, an overturned
court case, and the forgotten movement for world government,
this Article illustrates a simple proposition for historical legal
scholarship: laws, ideas, and institutions that appear in
hindsight to be failures can, and do, alter the course of history.
Crucially, the new research approach outlined herein allows
scholars to access this formerly unknown history that has
shaped the contemporary world of human rights. In this Article,
Senator John Bricker’s attempts to amend the United States
Constitution serve as a historical entry point for an analysis of
now-forgotten struggles that have fundamentally shaped the
development of human rights in the United States and continue
to exert an influence on contemporary affairs. The analysis
affirms that a complete explanatory account of contemporary
institutions and practices must include not only those laws,
institutions, ideas, and practices that persist into the present
day, but also the numerous institutional and ideational
antecedents that are no longer part of contemporary
understandings, structures, and practices (but were
nevertheless extremely influential in terms of contemporary
outcomes). Part IV of this Article synthesizes the contributions,
221. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, OFFICE OF PUB. AFF., supra note 22
(outlining the role of the international community and the possibility of a form
of world government); Preliminary Draft of a World Constitution, supra note 5
(explaining that there was a committee devoted to creating a world
constitution); Kaufman & Whiteman, supra note 42, at 321–32 (discussing how
Senator Bricker spent the majority of his time on the Senate floor in 1953
discussing the world government movement); Guide to the Beardsley Ruml
Papers, supra note 148 (discussing support for the world government
movement).
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consequences, and normative implications of this new approach,
as well as the history it uncovers.
As this Article makes clear, existing scholarship focuses a
great deal on Senator Bricker’s opposition to international
human rights treaties, infringements on sovereignty and
Constitutional provisions, and communism. At one level,
understanding Bricker’s contemporary influence requires
understanding and taking stock of his opposition against these
concepts. At the same time, leaving the historical analysis
unexplored severely impedes a full understanding of the history.
Such analysis is a prerequisite for fully appreciating the nature
of all that the contemporary world has inherited from the past.
First, concepts such as human rights, sovereignty,
communism, and so forth are abstract and void of inherent
meaning on their own. Indeed, as a practical matter, one does
not actually fight against such concepts per se, but against what
those concepts mean within the given social, political, legal and
historical context. Second, although they are extremely familiar,
these concepts are not naturally occurring entities. They require
individuals, groups, organizations—people—to define them with
respect to some underlying reality and to fight for them. So on
the one hand, it is indeed instructive to acknowledge and take
stock of the concepts and ideas that Bricker was in opposition to.
On the other hand, however, identifying the concepts is only a
very small part of a much broader conflict over the meaning of
those concepts, and therefore the overall historical story they
tell. Thus, in this kind of historical inquiry, once a concept is
identified as a key node of conflict, it is essential to incorporate
two questions into the analysis: First, what are the conflicting
meanings of those concepts within the given context? And
second, who is advocating for the conflicting meanings on each
side of the debate? Within the following example, the reasons for
this approach become clear.
It is most evident that one cannot rely on Bricker’s depiction
of the controversy as representing the truth. As this Article has
shown, Bricker is prone to exaggeration and outright fabrication.
Nevertheless, his rhetoric provides an entry point for situating
his response—as influential as it was—within the historical
context from which it came. If one shifts the analysis from simply
looking at concepts such as human rights, international treaties,
and sovereignty, for instance, and instead opens the inquiry to
focus on who he is fighting against and what those concepts in
the dispute actually mean in context, an immense, overlooked
portion of the historical record instantly comes to light.

2017]

HUMAN RIGHTS LOST

55

Immediately, these two questions open the door to a far more
expansive story that stretches years, if not decades, prior to
Bricker’s resolutions. The long, protracted battle extends far
beyond the halls of the United S Senate, implicating a set of
events that scholars have never fully connected with Bricker, nor
have they chronicled their momentous influence on the present
world.
In reviewing this history, it becomes apparent that Bricker
was one part of a much larger struggle over how nations and
their citizens were to organize themselves in the years following
World War II.222 Developing a new understanding of the human
rights concept—along with the necessary laws and institutions
in both the international and domestic realms for realizing that
particular concept—was a focal point in that struggle. What
emerged during these domestic struggles over the emergent
post-World War II human rights concept was a domestic
definition of human rights that we have carried into the present.
Today, it is generally taken for granted and accepted within the
United States that this international-only conception of human
rights is “just the way it is,” and presumed to have always been
so, if the matter even rises to consciousness in the first
instance.223 Though even if one were to consciously consider the
upshot of this international-only conception of human rights, it
would likely seem self-evident that international human rights
have no political impact on domestic events in the United States.
The history, as presented in this Article, shows otherwise. This
particular conception of human rights was created in large
measure to secure victory in a series of ongoing domestic political
battles. This history also shows that the contemporary
understanding of human rights within the United States is not
one that is inevitable or perpetual. It can just as easily—that is,
through domestic political struggles—be transformed into
something else entirely. The normative question that follows
close behind these observations and assertions is whether
incorporating international human rights into domestic law is
necessary and productive, or wrong-headed and destructive.

222. See ROBERTS, supra note 6, at 72–76 (discussing the general opposition
against the idea of human rights after World War II from individuals,
mainstream groups, nations, conservative leaders, and progressive scholars).
223. See generally Oona A. Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a
Difference, 111 YALE L.J. 1935, 1937–42 (2002) (discussing that although the
United States and other countries often sign human rights treaties, they do not
always comply with them).
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With knowledge of this history, advocates today might
legitimately worry that pushing for domestic recognition of
human rights would be counterproductive for their causes. As
experienced during the 1940s and 1950s, the backlash for such
attempts was swift, severe, and long lasting.224 But as the
history also shows, from such failures came lasting changes in
civil rights practices and laws.225 New international and regional
organizations emerged as well.226 Strong notions of domestic
human rights and global political institutions never came to
fruition, but they did offer a credible threat for those who sought
to hold on to segregation and American isolationism. That
credible threat applied an additional force upon the ongoing
social and political issues of the moment. Yet, in the
contemporary United States there is no such force to leverage.
The possibility of even suggesting that human rights could be
leveraged at home is absent, in great measure because of the
outcomes of the history described in this Article.
If human rights are to one day be incorporated into United
States law and politics, the existing conceptual definition of
human rights—as soft obligations entirely separate from
domestic law—cannot do. After all, it is entirely incompatible
with the notion of domestic incorporation. But it is also just a
conception that was created in the midst of domestic political
and social struggles. It can be redefined anew within the course
of other domestic struggles, of which there are countless to
choose from: Black Lives Matter, the 99%, the war on religion,
and so forth. What is crucial to recognize, though, is that the
understanding of human rights that emerges from such
struggles does not necessarily have to be a meaning that benefits
the poor and the downtrodden. In fact, the ability to define
human rights requires a power and unity of purpose that either
side of such struggles can effect. Human rights can be just as

224. MARY L. DUDZIAK, COLD WAR CIVIL RIGHTS: RACE AND THE IMAGE OF
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 12 (2000) (discussing how the choice of civil rights
activists to air their grievances at the United Nations was viewed as a “great
breach of loyalty,” and led to the further silencing of civil rights advocates
through passport restrictions and red-baiting).
225. See id. at 209–10 (discussing how the international reaction to the state
of civil rights in the United States helped the passage of the Civil Rights Act
1964).
226. Kim D. Reiman, A View from the Top: International Politics, Norms and
the Worldwide Growth of NGOs, 50 INT’L STUD. Q. 45, 45 (2006) (discussing the
rapid growth of nongovernmental organizations in the post-World War II
period).
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easily defined to help maintain the status quo and to assist the
elite. 227
In the end, perhaps the matter is not as momentous as it
seems. Perhaps opponents do not have to be so fearful of
“external” human rights laws restricting their freedoms and
altering their way of life; the past seven decades show that it
certainly possible to define human rights in such a way that they
are actually quite consistent with any notion of freedom or any
particular way of living. But there is a bigger issue that has for
the past seventy years been hidden beneath the supposed
specter of “foreign law,” and has been the cause of such
apprehension and opposition against international human
rights. The opponents of bringing international human rights
into the domestic arena fear that existing political struggles and
longstanding ideological battles covering the entire range of
issues in the United States would be upended and indeed they
would.228 If human rights did possess normative legitimacy in
the domestic United States context, they most certainly would
catapult the now-deadlocked balance of power in American
politics towards horizons never before seen. It was this
particular vision of legal integration that caused the opponents
in the 1950s to react so strongly and organize so rapidly. But
interestingly, the wellspring of hope that the possibility of
domestic human rights provided for many Americans in the
1940s and 1950s seems today to have run dry. Today they are
not a domestic option; nor are they much of a thought.
What all of this means is simple: the United States’
international-only conception of human rights is wrong. Human
rights battles are local, and the United States’ internationalonly understanding of them has served as silent proxy for a
broad swath of social, political, and economic issues ranging
from healthcare, voting rights, race, business, to education,

227. See generally Hathaway, supra note 223, at 1940 (finding that “not a
single treaty for which ratification seems to be reliably associated with better
human rights practices and several for which it appears to be associated with
worse practices . . . human rights treaties may sometimes lead to poorer human
rights practices within the countries that ratify them.”).
228. See generally Amy C. Harfeld, Oh Righteous Delinquent One: The
United States’ International Human Rights Double Standard - Explanation,
Example, and Avenues for Change, 4 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 59, 68 (2001) (discussing
that “[o]pponents of human-rights treaty ratification have justified their
position with a wide array of arguments” including that ratification would
“diminish fundamental American rights; violate states’ rights,” and more).
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disability issues, homeschooling, and so forth. The way that the
opponents once dealt with the threat was to delegitimize the
human rights idea in the domestic context while allowing it to
flourish internationally as the solution to global problems.
Interestingly, and to a great extent, the strongest proponents of
human rights in the United States have fallen in line and do the
same.

Conclusion
The goal of this Article has been threefold. First, the Article
aimed to identify collective analytic blind spots in the history of
human rights and outline an approach that permits scholars to
see within the historical record what has formerly been invisible.
This analytic approach emphasizes understanding the formative
role of overlooked laws, ideas, and institutions that failed to
endure yet have had a lasting influence on United States
politics. Second, the Article endeavored to apply this new
analytic framework to a well-known historical event
surrounding human rights in the United States—the Bricker
controversy—and to show that we have missed much of the story
to date. The Article marshals an impressive amount of newly
uncovered original evidence to open a historical door that most
never even knew was there. Finally, the Article aimed to
demonstrate the profound contemporary implications of the
prevailing conception of human rights within the United States.
In outlining a new approach to such legal and historical
inquiries, revealing previously unknown aspects of the history of
human rights in the United States, and demonstrating the
lasting influence of now-forgotten events, this Article shows that
contemporary conceptions of human rights are not in fact
international but rather reflect local struggles, the outcomes of
which persist for decades
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World Government
 S. Res. 183, 79th Cong. (1945) (“Creation of a World
Republic”)
o Senator Glen H. Taylor (D., Idaho)
o October 24, 1945
 S. Con. Res. 54, 80th Cong. (1948)
o Proposed Meeting Of President-Elect Of United
States And Marshal Stalin Concerning World
Government
o Senator Glen H. Taylor
 H. Con. Res. 64, 81st Cong. (1949) (“World Federation”)
o Representatives Brooks Hays (D., Arkansas) and
Walter H. Judd (R., Minnesota), and eventually 111
co-sponsors.
 S. Con. Res. 56, 81st Cong. (1949) (“World Federation”)
o Senator Charles W. Tobey (R., New Hampshire) and
eventually 21 co-sponsors
o Identical to H. Con. Res 64 (1949)
 S. Con. Res. 66, 81st Cong. (1949) (“World Government
Constitution”)
o Senator Glen H. Taylor (D., Idaho), September
13,1949
Strengthening the UN by Amending the UN Charter
 H. Con. Res. 163, 80th Cong. (1948) (“Culbertson ABC
Plan”)
o Representative Walter H. Judd (R., Minnesota)
and fourteen cosponsors, including Richard
Nixon (R., California, HCR-170)
o Identical to S. Con. Res. 50 (1948)
 S. Con. Res. 50, 80th Cong. (1948)
o Requesting the President to initiate measures
for a revision of the United Nations Charter
o Senator Homer Ferguson (R., Michigan) and
fifteen cosponsors, March 16, 1948
o Identical to H. Con. Res. 163 (1948)
 H.R. Res. 6802, 80th Cong. (1948) (“Strengthening The
United Nations”)
o Representative Charles Eaton (R., New Jersey)
for the House Foreign Affairs Committee
o June 9, 1948
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S. Res. 239, 80th Cong. (1948) (“Regional Security”)
o Passed, June 11,1948 (vote of 64-4)
o Senator Arthur Vandenberg (R., Michigan) for
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
S. Res. 133, 81st Cong. (1949) (“World Alliance”)
o Senator John Sparkman (D., Alabama) and
nine cosponsors, including Karl E. Mundt (R.,
South Dakota) and John Stennis (D.,
Mississippi)
S. Res. 95, 80th Cong. (1947) (“World Disarmament
Conference”)
o Senator Millard Tydings (D., Maryland)
H. Con. Res. 163, 80th Cong. (1948) (“Culbertson ABC
Plan”)
o Identical to S. Con. Res. 50 (1948)
o Representative Walter H. Judd (R., Minnesota)
and fourteen cosponsors, including Richard
Nixon (R., California, HCR-170)
S. Con. Res. 50, 80th Cong. (1948) (“Culbertson ABC
Plan”)
o Senator Homer Ferguson (R., Michigan) and
fifteen cosponsors, March 16, 1948 [Identical to
HCR-163]
S. Res. 239, 80th Cong. (1948) (“Regional Security”)
o Passed, June 11,1948 (vote of 64-4)
o Senator Arthur Vandenberg (R., Michigan) for
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
S. Res. 133, 81st Cong. (1949) (“World Alliance”)
o Senator John Sparkman (D., Alabama) and
nine cosponsors, including Karl E. Mundt (R.,
South Dakota) and John Stennis (D.,
Mississippi)

Working with the UN
 S. Con. Res. 72, 81st Cong. (1950)
o February 7, 1950
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Regional Federation
 S. Con. Res. 10, 80th Cong. (1947) (“United States of
Europe”)
o Senators J. William Fulbright (D., Arkansas)
and Elbert D. Thomas (D., Utah)
o March 21, 1947
 S. Con. Res. 12, 80th Cong. (1947) (“United Democratic
States Of Europe”)
o Senator Alexander Wiley (R., Wisconsin)
o Identical to S. Con. Res. 24
 S. Con. Res. 12, 81st Cong. (1949) (“European
Federation”)
o Senators J. William Fulbright (D., Arkansas)
and Elbert D. Thomas (D., Utah)
 North Atlantic Treaty, Apr. 4, 1949, 63 Stat. 2241, 34
U.N.T.S. 243.
o First peacetime military alliance the U.S.
entered outside the Western Hemisphere.
 S. Con. Res. 57, 81st Cong. (1949) (“Atlantic Union”)
o Senator Estes Kefauver (D., Tennessee) and
eventually 20 co-sponsors, including Walter F.
George (D., Georgia), Guy M. Gillette (D.,
Iowa), J. William Fulbright (D., Arkansas),
Harley M. Kilgore (D., West Virginia), Lister
Hill (D., Alabama), John Sparkman (D.,
Alabama), Joseph R. McCarthy (R., Wisconsin)
o July 26, 1949
 H. Con. Res. 107–111, 81st Cong. (1949) (“Atlantic
Union”)
o Representative Walter H. Judd (R., Minnesota)
and four co-sponsors, including Hale Boggs (D.,
Louisiana) and James W. Wadsworth (R., New
York)
o Identical to S. Con. Res. 57 (1949)
o July 26, 1949
 S. Con. Res. 52, 81st Cong. (1949)
o Supplemental Agreement Of The United
Nations To Aid Signatories In Case Of Attack
o Senators Elbert Thomas (D. Utah) and Paul H.
Douglas (D., Illinois)
o Plan to work within the UN / NATO for security
agreement.

